
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS

Selected Writings

by

Don McDowell



2000

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS: SELECTED WRITINGS

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PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

This booklet is a collection of articles and speeches generated over nearly a decade. The separate articles have all been “published” in some form or other; the speeches likewise. This second edition has been updated to include the original articles plus those published in 1999 and 2000.

Pulling these articles together in a single booklet has one fundamental advantage. Those who wish to make a study of the development of doctrine and practice in strategic intelligence now have an opportunity to consider this assembly of thoughts - and to see them in the context of the development of my own thought processes about these issues over time.

Going over what is now old ground has been, for me, an exercise in intellectual discipline. There are statements I made several years ago that, with hindsight, I wish I could now change. However the real value in this collection lies in the very fact that the doctrine has had to adapt to various pressures. It is easy to accept that any set of “living” standards and codes of behaviour must change with circumstances. Many of us would consider that statement in its most positive and beneficial light. What is harder is to have to accept now is that many of the changes we in the intelligence community are going through are not necessarily changes for the better. They can and are being forced upon us by lack of vision and foresight, management inadequacies, and lack of fortitude to continue striving to do well in the face of mediocre performance and misplaced expectations.

I owe a debt of gratitude to my colleagues, students and fellow-professionals in “the craft of intelligence,” and I thank you and trust that this collection of ideas and concepts illuminates some of the problems encountered in doing strategic intelligence work.

*Don McDowell
Bredbo, Australia
July 2000*

**FORECASTING THE UNEXPECTED
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND ITS USE
IN MAPPING POTENTIAL REFUGEE MOVEMENT
(2000)**

ABSTRACT

This article owed its development to the rapidly changing situation worldwide in respect of illegal mass migration. The obvious lack of preparedness of countries to cope with the sudden and unexpected arrival of large numbers of refugees should raise concern amongst all those concerned in national strategic planning. The article focuses on the rationale and benefits of using strategic intelligence and analysis to provide forward warning about potential threats and impact of mass movement of refugees. Publication was in CROSS BORDER CONTROL, Issue 14, February/March 2000.

A NEW THREAT

In the century just ended, the world has hardly known a period in which there hasn't been a war of some kind going on. As nations have done battle over issues of ideology and territory, whole population groups have been put at risk with the inevitable post-war chaos of death, industrial ruin and shattered beliefs. Even though there has been no event on the scale of a Third World War as yet, over five decades on "non-war" since the late 1940s have been studded with an endless range of low intensity conflicts and mini-wars in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Increasingly, the rationale for such conflict events has tended to beggar understanding and to sap international patience and sympathy. Yet now, as never before, the results of war have unexpected and far reaching effects and weigh heavily on not just the rich and privileged nations, but on any country within reach of the dispossessed, the homeless and the under-privileged.

One worrying outcome of modern conflict is the unexpected, unplanned and unregulated large-scale movement of refugees fleeing to any safe haven. The common view is that national border control forces have the primary responsibility for dealing with this flow, but is this the only answer?

Many countries are feeling the impact of the refugee flow, although this in itself is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, a well-documented feature of the post-war years following 1918 and 1945 is the movement and re-settlement of refugees under benign immigration programs. National and international control systems for legally defined and declared refugees exist to allocate quotas for such immigrant populations. International negotiation and diplomatic agreement on the disposition of refugee populations is the norm and orderly arrangements can be made for transportation, reception, processing and eventual absorption of the refugee families into the host society.

Far from the orderly model of refugee movement described above, what gives rise to current concern is the fact that, in recent years, there has been an increase in what is now thought of as the "illegal migration" of large refugee population groups. Mobile populations from the Balkans, the Middle East and Asia have flowed well beyond what we might expect to be their "logical" geo-political regions and targeted areas of the Pacific Rim and western Europe. This new form of unauthorised migration falls well outside of those earlier (and continuing) control systems and the planning that underpins them. Nor is this new form of migration a substitute for the older systems. The new wave of illegal human movement is in addition to normal refugee and immigration patterns and has the capacity to severely disrupt them by overturning the carefully planned basis for their very existence.

DEALING WITH THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES

As an example of the impact of these changes to normal migration patterns, consider the cases of Australia and Canada. In 1999 "boat people" refugees from Asia targeted Canada's western coastline, causing that country to mobilise its immigration and police forces to observe and detain refugees as they landed in the country. Last year, too, similar voyages of boat people targeted Australia, this time coming not from Asia (as has historically been the case since the mid 1970s) but from the Middle East via Indonesian waters. The "boat people phenomenon" highlights the stress that such illegal migration movement places on any country's *planned* migration programs. The impact of a sudden arrival of a contingent of refugees poses immediate problem-solving challenges that divert even the best-laid procedures.

It is not uncommon for these groups to arrive needing urgent help with their health and nutrition and emotional well-being, wanting a secure environment and ultimately needing to be segregated and detained for processing. The efforts of the various stakeholder agencies are co-ordinated to provide this support and, while such activity is generally well within their capabilities, it is not what they would have planned to do nor is it necessarily something that easily be handled without special budget and resource allocations. In each case, what suffers potentially is the direction and focus of the department's efforts: dealing with the immediate threat rather than getting on with the on-going activity of the policy-driven immigration policy.

No matter how worthwhile is the case for sympathy in dealing with these refugee movements, the arguable result of unplanned and chaotic population shifting is to place the receiving countries in the position of being "victims." Where the country already has well-developed policies in place to allow and even facilitate immigration of refugee communities, and to actively assist in the process of their assimilation into society, it seems unfortunate - to say the least - that those that are helpful and willing are sometimes the very ones that suffer. Indeed, their very willingness to help becomes an attraction and leads to the popular misperception that such countries are an "easy touch."

What is being done to stem the flow or at least secure the borders from unwanted ingress of illegal immigrants and refugees? More to the point, what can be done to enhance the routines presently in place?

USING INTELLIGENCE

Much of the traditional work of immigration departments and border control agencies involves a complex web of processes designed to facilitate passage through borders and yet, at the same time, keep a watch on the nature of that traffic. Whether the commodities are people or goods and regardless, therefore, of whether the responsibilities are those of immigration authorities or customs agencies, it is the integrity of these control systems that, alone, maintains national security.

However, the world is changing and in many areas the national borders are being made deliberately more porous than has previously been the case. A prime example is the impact on the member states of the European Union, where now EU citizens have virtually free access, entry and exit across all borders. Similarly, the flow of goods between EU countries is now markedly less inhibited by customs checks. For border control authorities in this environment, the role has changed dramatically and as perhaps less attention need be placed on the movement of EU nationals and goods, more effort can be directed towards inwards and outwards movements from and to foreign destinations.

Border control agencies have always relied of inspection and investigation and their primary tools of trade, developing profiles and looking for suspicious behaviour to stimulate their intervention into on-going transfer of goods and movement of people. But it is intelligence that is the turn-key here, focused on identifying problematic behaviour, mapping and describing it in a way that allows preventive action plans to be developed.

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The application of intelligence techniques and practices within the area of **immigration** controls is not new. Many immigration departments have had intelligence units for years and these commonly produce useful products concerning the threats against normal movement into and out of any country. A traditional role for intelligence has been to provide descriptive information and insight about the status and nature of moving populations. Where criminality and risks associated with health and terrorism are, for example, perceived then it is the intelligence unit's role to describe and analyse those risks. The purpose behind this is to aid in the detection and prevention process by providing profiles as well as specific leads and direction about undesirable persons or groups.

The single most important aspect of this sort of intelligence effort is that it forewarns and guides operational focus at the border, enabling the detection and interdiction of those entries/exits that are considered dangerous or unacceptable in national interest terms.

By way of comparison, in the case of **customs and excise** activity, the fundamental role of intelligence is not dissimilar to that of immigration. The generation of profiles and warning alerts, the development of hard leads and the issue of information of the "look for . . ." type, are all grist for the customs intelligence officer's mill. It is a fact of life that most of these activities are related to the national need to detect and prevent the import and export of prohibited or strategic goods. Only to a lesser degree does intelligence turn its attention to other customs activities, such as those related to value-added taxation, to goods movement where the compliance regulations are more focused on tariffs, bounties and subsidies, and to dumping of goods on unsuspecting markets.

EXTENDING THE INTELLIGENCE HORIZON

In the two foregoing examples, intelligence is taken up and applied principally in its traditional role of supporting the maintenance of border integrity in furtherance of national interest. One could ask, though, why is the intelligence emphasis principally applied at the border itself? Are there other uses for intelligence?

The phenomenon of refugee flow has generally attracted intelligence focus towards reaching for an understanding of it as a precursor to developing programs and plans to deal with it. Amongst all the intelligence effort applied, little or no attempt has traditionally been made to forecast and pre-empt such flow. To understand this, we can gain a clear perspective by using the following means of classifying mass migration, using event timing as the key indicator for differing types and applications of intelligence effort:

- post arrival
- en-route travel
- pre-departure from point of origin

In simple terms, these three categories of intelligence explain just how intelligence does, or could, work. For example, the first category is very common and could be thought of as a function of a "they're here already" approach. The challenge for intelligence is to support investigation of circumstances and events that have already got out of control by demonstrating that the border control systems have failed as well as helping in the profiling of the refugees themselves.

The second category is very common and, in the cases of both Canadian and Australian experience described earlier, both countries became aware of the migration of boat people while they were still at sea. Detection may occur by relying upon the deployment of national defence air and naval forces or sightings by commercial aircraft and maritime vessels. Once detected, intelligence resources are used to identify and profile the refugees and would-be migrants to achieve two outcomes. One is to prepare the way for reception activity and the other is the commencement of the painstaking check-back processes to explore the antecedents of the groups. This latter is a preparatory step prior to the arrival and individual checking that must take place, given that all such checks are similar to those that, in the case of approved migration, would have taken place before approval and departure from the home country.

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The third category of time-critical intelligence is the very one which nation states arguably must have, but rarely succeed in acquiring in time. It is concerned with generating far-horizon predictive intelligence about populations that *might* be planning to move. It is only this form of intelligence capacity that can truly change a nation's status of awareness and provide the opportunity to take deterrent and preventive action to protect the national border.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND MASS-MIGRATION

There are two principal uses of strategic intelligence assessment in the arena of immigration responsibility. The first and by far the most common is its use in describing the phenomenon of refugee flow in terms of its ethnic grouping or country of origin. Such a study will typically specify a known problem population and explore and define the intentions concerning migration and the background to the group in the context of culture, religion, history and so on. In foreign and defence intelligence terminology, this is the stuff of background briefings and can be used as the springboard for determining the meaning of changing circumstances and new events affecting the group.

This form of strategic *backgrounder* is useful to establish conceptual understanding of the population group so that appropriate plans may be laid for eventual reception. Data gathering for this intelligence product is rarely difficult, given that so much usually exists and, once completed, the assessment will probably enjoy a fairly long shelf-life provided that essential maintenance and updating is carried out by the intelligence analysts.

Whether both Canada and Australia possessed this sort of strategic picture concerning their respective "visitors" during 1998 and 1999 is not particularly the issue. What is almost certain is that the task of developing an up-to-date picture about Asian groups and those from Iran and Iraq certainly should not have been particularly difficult. The main drawback was the suddenness of their impending arrival and the stress that imposed for quick compilation and evaluation of information to produce a comprehensive and insightful strategic study. To some degree one can observe that these events resulted in the intelligence role being a reactive one. In similar circumstances the intelligence background studies would undoubtedly be useful, but they would not necessarily be the sort of product that confers any advantage in forecasting what could happen.

The challenge to provide forward warning of events is legitimately one for strategic intelligence, however, the tasking has to be specific to make it happen that way. Although strategic intelligence can produce a range of different types of analytical products, it is only by being specific in tasking that an agency can ensure it gets the type of intelligence product it needs.

What then can be done to provide forward warning about mass migration of refugees, genuine or otherwise? Clearly the basic mind-set about intelligence has to change. Intelligence is useful in aiding investigative effort to impact on immigration and border control policies and operations. But that need not be its only function. Instead of constantly focusing on the immediate and the urgent, some resource must be made available to consider the over-the-horizon possibilities of unwelcome mass migration that will, one day perhaps soon, threaten one's national borders.

The call for strategic intelligence forecasting of potential migrant groups will necessarily result in some fine judgement and speculative thinking at the end of the day, even though the analytical processes themselves will be structured and disciplined. It is the nature of long-term forecasting that, with the best will in the world and with the application of what could be termed "orderly creativity," a high level of judgement must still be applied. One doubts that Australia's immigration and foreign affairs authorities would have naturally considered refugees from Iran and Iraq to figure high on their list of probabilities, but why not? If it is the case that the conventional wisdom pre-empted this scenario, then we should be able to figure that it is the conventional wisdom that is out of place.

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What we can learn from that experience, as much as from the Canadian one with Asian refugees, is that there is a strong reason for establishing and tasking a strategic intelligence capacity to explore the risk and threat of migratory activity that could impact on one's own national security. It may be fairly easy to understand why Vietnamese boat people fled to Hong Kong in terms of its proximity and cultural affinity and even, at the time, the benign attitudes of the British colonial powers. The links are fairly obvious and there had already been a history of similar movements since the mid 1970s, out of Vietnam to other destinations where the motivation seemed even then to be relatively transparent. But the latest movement of Middle Eastern refugees to Australia bedevils imagination; because "it couldn't happen," no one went looking for it.

CONCLUSION

We need to overcome the mind-set that prevents government authorities and particularly border control groups from seeing into the future. So long as conflict continues in various parts of the world, so long as transportation becomes more available, even though at perhaps usurious prices, then the disadvantaged peoples will continue to look for safe havens. If help cannot come to them as in the case of Chechnya, then perhaps their preferred answer is to help themselves to a way out.

Defence and foreign affairs analysts have, for decades, been developing strategic forecasts of the indicators-and-warnings type. That role is well legitimised since it has proven to be the only sure way to set up systems to explore and monitor even the most apparently unlikely scenarios. Whenever things go wrong and the unexpected happens, it always seems that it was our expectations that prevented us from seeing the unusual.

Using strategic analysis to examine the conditions that give rise to a desire to mobilise, and to then determine destination and transportation scenarios, is hardly that difficult. Certainly this sort of use of intelligence will take time and provide speculative answers, but their value will be in the fact they provoke consideration of the possible and the less-than-obvious, all designed to aid in national planning and policy-formulation. Surely the threat and financial costs and social disruption caused by being the target of unheralded mass migration and refugee flow is worth the effort of investment in this type of intelligence capability.

QUO VADIS STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE? OVERVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE (1999)

SUMMARY¹

This paper is the author's personal perspective. It is a worldwide view of the situation concerning the development, introduction and implementation of strategic intelligence within law enforcement as at the middle of 1999. The opinions are derived from my personal observations and close working association with specific intelligence units and their parent organisations.

INTRODUCTION

This section covers an international view of the development, introduction and implementation of strategic intelligence within law enforcement. The opinions are derived from the author's personal observations and close working association with specific intelligence units and their parent organisations. The purpose of this section is not simply to provide information about the background and the current situation concerning strategic intelligence. While this sort of information-giving is essential to ensure that we remain up-to-date about what is going on around us, the real focus of the section is inevitably on working out how to improve the current state of affairs to the benefit of our clients and ourselves, as professionals in the field of intelligence.

Many adaptations of strategic intelligence mentioned in this section go beyond traditional law enforcement applications, and the purpose of citing them here is to indicate the universal flexibility and usefulness of strategic intelligence. However, the main focus of the section remains concentrated on enforcement in all its aspects, and to probe the relationship between strategic intelligence and our ability to both better understand and explain the present, and to explore and prepare ourselves (as well as our clients) for the future.

A dose of real honesty is relevant here. It can be fairly claimed that, at least in some countries, strategic intelligence has either been successfully introduced or is in the process of being so. These countries/agencies are mentioned in comments and footnotes elsewhere in this book and, while pleasing from a professional advancement point of view, it should be of concern that so few of the major agencies are committed to the objectives of properly establishing a strategic intelligence capability. It seems to be the case that the original enthusiasm is in some danger of being diminished, blunted and marginalised.

HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS

A useful start-point for this section may be to provide some brief background that explains how strategic intelligence came to be introduced formally into enforcement. In 1989 I wrote my first paper about strategic intelligence and its essential application to law enforcement planning. My belief at that time was that strategic intelligence had barely been given a mention in any of the available literature about law enforcement and its intelligence support structures and mechanisms. The popular and respected intelligence authors of the 1980s (Maartens, Morris and Peterson to name but a few) rarely, if ever, mentioned strategic intelligence. Of course, intelligence journals from the military and national security areas frequently referred to the genre. However, it

¹ This paper is a personal appraisal of the development, introduction, implementation and outlook for strategic intelligence within the international law enforcement community. It was originally delivered by the author at the EUROPOL International Conference of Intelligence Analysts in The Netherlands in October 1996. Since that time, additional material has been added to reflect continuing developments and experiences in Australia, Canada and various European Union member countries. This revised version was updated in 1999, with extracts appearing in Police Review (UK) in July that year, and again updated for presentation in Mexico City in April 2000.

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was and to some degree still remains my observation that no-one had bothered to focus on this topic, to think it through, and to articulate the concepts and their potential application in modern law enforcement. Early articles were aimed at consciousness-raising by writing about the usefulness of strategic intelligence for meeting increasing demands that law enforcement become less reactive to the changing world crime scene and, instead, focus more positively on forward-looking and forecasting (the concept of “proactivity” so often mentioned). Hand in hand with this was a program of research that resulted in the development of the core of what has become an accepted “model” for strategic research in law enforcement.

Perhaps more important than merely providing training was my then agency’s commitment to using strategic intelligence to develop risk and opportunity analysis of certain crime phenomena in Australia, using the strategic intelligence model developed². The first real test of the concepts and doctrine came during 1990 and 1991, when the government requested a strategic assessment of the relationship between the criminal and social environment involving illegal drugs. The purpose was to examine these issues and recommend changes to health, education, social and police policies and to the entire body of Australian law affecting such issues. A by-product of the task was to test the model itself as the basic research mechanism. We were to make it available for peer-group review and critical appraisal, and then publish it in the form of a guidance handbook for use by Australian enforcement agencies - which we did in 1991 and again in 1997 following a substantial re-write.

Finally, to complete these introductory notes, it is appropriate to point out that while I had (and still have) no illusions that the model is static or “carved in stone.” The research routines are constantly being fine-tuned with the benefit of increasing experience in applying it to a growing variety of applications. It is worth noting, though, that no other model was offered as alternative thinking, then or since, by member agencies of the law enforcement community.

PROGRESS IN THE 1990S

Since 1990, the cause of strategic intelligence has been advancing steadily on several fronts in terms of diverse applications and international acceptance. A consistent theme, though, is that there are two principal objectives that need to be jointly achieved if strategic intelligence is to become as successful and useful a component of law enforcement planning as it has served the needs of national defence and security.

- Firstly, there is still a continuing need to convince senior managers and executives that good planning must be preceded by good analysis, and that strategic intelligence is a particularly apposite tool for this purpose.
- Secondly, there is of course the need to ensure appropriate training be given as widely as possible in order to educate and empower analysts at all levels and from all walks of life, to understand what is involved in applying their skills to strategic issues.

CHANGING MANAGERS’ BELIEFS

To meet the main objective, that of *developing management conviction*, many speeches and papers have been presented, explaining and praising the pivotal nature of strategic research as the foundation for understanding and preparedness for changes in criminality. For some agencies, implanting this vision has been achieved through special training workshops conducted specifically for middle-to-senior managers who, in their normal work situations, become the “clients” of strategic analysis. Such workshop opportunities are generally few and far between, with significant differences between the approach taken by different executive “boards of management.” For example, of the major police forces in the world very few have had access to the sort of familiarisation that is essential to change thinking and open up an opportunistic view of the value of strategic analysis.

² At the time, the author was Director of the Strategic Crime Studies unit of the Australian federal Attorney-General's Department.

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One major inhibitor to spreading this doctrine has been the lack of availability of managers and executives to participate in what has been largely described as “unnecessary” because of existing levels of management awareness. It has been interesting to observe that although it can fairly be said that all senior police managers have some familiarity about intelligence and its potential, few indeed have more than a superficial level of understanding about the specific *benefits* of strategic analysis and, as a balancing element, their *obligations* (as clients or managers) to help make any strategic research system function effectively. On the plus side, wherever the manager workshops have taken place³ there has been a direct increase in their interest in acquiring strategic intelligence product to aid in operational and policy decision-making.

HELPING THE ANALYSTS

As to the *preparation and nurturing of analysts* to undertake strategic research, there has been a continuing program to bring practitioner-level training to intelligence agencies throughout Europe, Canada and Australasia. Courses have attracted attendance from a wide variety of agencies (law enforcement as well as others), involving many hundreds of trainees. It is pleasing to note that the course design and the teaching strategies used have become increasingly acceptable as “benchmarks” for several agencies of world repute⁴ and the fact of high demand for such training reinforces the belief that the strategic intelligence “message” is getting through. These courses focus on *principle* as well as *application*. They are directed towards getting analysts to become skillful at conceptual analysis, only relying on other, more quantitative “tools” as the requirements of any particular case dictate. In terms of applying strategic intelligence to real life problems in law enforcement and regulation, there is now an established track record of it being used to examine and recommend strategies for handling many major enforcement and compliance problems. Examples include:

- illegal drugs
- domestic violence
- exploitation of minors (including child abuse and paedophilia)
- violent crime
- immigration and the illegal movement of refugees
- terrorism and other forms of politically-motivated violence
- organised crime in its many forms and ethnic groupings
- financial crime, including money-laundering
- large-scale fraud of many varieties
- environmental crime, including pollution control and protection of endangered wild flora and fauna

It is worth looking further at the contrast between law enforcement and its utilisation of strategic intelligence, as opposed to other adaptations and applications. For example, take note of the way in which the strategic intelligence concepts and principles, as they are taught, have been picked up and adapted by non-police organisations. This is important as a signal of the universal usefulness of proper research at this level - providing analysis and illuminating issues above the level of our usual daily preoccupation with operational matters. Such projects and applications have included the following:

³ For example, there has been a heavy concentration of these in The Netherlands, the UK and Canada in recent years.

⁴ Europol, H.M. Customs and Excise (U.K.), the National Criminal Intelligence Service (UK), The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Dutch National Police Service are among the committed adherents to the training doctrine, regarding this program as the “benchmark” for strategic intelligence training.

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- in the field of environmental regulation, the examination of wildlife issues in the context of the impact of crime and other forms of loss on conservation and protection policies and laws;
- consideration of the broad trends in industrial development and the potential risks associated with pollution control regulations and compliance mechanisms, and their abuse, negligence, incompetence or deliberate avoidance;
- in the area of government tax regulation, strategic intelligence has been used to both chart the trends in avoidance and minimisation schemes, and to conduct impact analysis associated with potential changes to tax systems - looking at all aspects including economic implications and criminal opportunities

Overall there seems to be no real argument that strategic intelligence and analysis are useful tools for addressing enforcement interests and facilitating forward planning and threat minimisation. But reality falls well short of promise, even after these past several years of experience and growth. Mere statements of support and understanding by police agencies for this “new” intelligence tool demonstrably over-reach the realities involved in commitment to effective implementation.

This is not a phenomenon limited particularly to any country but rather one that can be universally observed. The key issue here is that while the acceptance of strategic research within enforcement circles in Europe has gone well beyond the experience of other countries, even so there are continuing difficulties in matching the hyperbole of the language of commitment with the reality of resourcing and management everywhere.

CURRENT SITUATION: CHALLENGES FOR THE PROFESSION

Even given the experience of some ten years, there are many issues that can almost certainly be improved upon. We should recognise and acknowledge just how much ground has been made in the last several years to bring the image of strategic analysis to the forefront of law enforcement intelligence thinking. There are many positives to be proud of but, as with anything new, there are still many attitudes and behaviour that need to be improved or altered if strategic analysis is to deliver its promises. This is possible only if we face up to the deficiencies and try to develop strategies for change.

A basic issue in explaining and justifying the use of strategic intelligence to law enforcement managers hard-pressed for results and resources has always been the nexus between strategic intelligence and operational intelligence. A fundamental principle of our profession is that all intelligence activity serves specific needs, but the total effort must support the whole of the agency’s role and responsibilities. In other words, to be most effective, intelligence must provide help for all that agency’s interests.

Operational intelligence⁵ is fine in its place. However, just as it does little for upper-level planning, nor does strategic intelligence answer all the issues relevant to operational responsibilities. Thus, there can be no real argument that any one form of intelligence is in competition with any other, or is more useful or meaningful than any other. Each is part of a whole, and all contribute in their own ways to specific vested client interests and goals within their organisation.

It seems that this principle is still seen as both logical and acceptable, and indeed the *marketing* and advertising of intelligence (and we should acknowledge that part of intelligence functioning is to *sell* itself) are effective in reaching out to responsible and concerned audiences, such as managers and executives. However, something is still seriously deficient, for it is obvious from the way in which strategic intelligence is being implemented that there are, in fact, tensions between the two separate, sectoral intelligence interests.

⁵ Throughout this paper the term “operational intelligence” has been used to suggest intelligence activity that provides immediate levels of support to line units. While many intelligence organisations use and differentiate between the terms “tactical” and “operational”, such terminology is by no means universally accepted nor are the same definitions applied between agencies. In these circumstances, it is the author’s choice to settle on the single term “operational” simply to distinguish it (and tactical intelligence) from “strategic.”

TENSIONS AND PRESSURES

What is the problem? This section is hardly the place for a lengthy dissertation on all that is wrong in this respect, but there are some main points that can and deserve to be made and considered. These include the following issues.

Expectations of police accountability for expenditure and performance outcomes are often interpreted as meaning that units are expected to report “satisfactorily” on quantifiable outcomes and activities, such as

- cases
- prosecutions
- arrests
- seizures
- charges

The vision of policing and regulation as a protective deterrent for society is thus sublimated in favour of measurable “hit rates”:

- this leaves intelligence to be judged specifically (and almost solely) on the basis of its worth in terms of input to the hit rate
- those who measure and judge the success and usefulness of intelligence are increasingly encouraged to find a direct link between the intelligence product and the resulting investigative successes (arrests or whatever)

Wherever strategic intelligence has been introduced into a police culture, it has largely been accorded some special status consistent with its focus on in-depth research into issues of significance to upper management levels. The results from such special treatment can be often observed to include the following:

- Selection of analysts who are, for the most part, “different” from the norms ordinarily associated with operational intelligence. This is understandable given the purpose and demands of strategic intelligence, but there is a consequence that may be as unintended as it is unfortunate. That is that such selection practices can impart an image of elitism that tends to distance the strategic analyst from the concerns of everyday intelligence functioning.
- In almost every intelligence unit visited across three continents, strategic intelligence is organisationally separate from operational intelligence activities. While it is understandable that there is some separation from the norms by virtue of the level of client and the types of topics and depth of focus, this isolation often extends to intellectual and emotional separation of the various parts of the intelligence apparatus.
- The end result is one in which each “half” of the intelligence effort ends up with diminished contact with the other, a decrease in mutual understanding and sharing of ideas about different aspects of common issues, and a loss of mutual respect.

This separation of the intelligence interests also tends to drive a wedge between the respective client groups themselves, and field commanders and central office executives can easily develop a highly parochial and partisan view of the whole world of intelligence - depending on their respective needs for intelligence support.

Finally, it is quite commonly observed that field units (for example) and their attached, supporting intelligence cells are ignorant of the relevance and potential value of strategic intelligence. By the same token,

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strategic intelligence units and their client groups can (and do) develop a disdain for acknowledging any value in the information and interpretations that derive from operational intelligence.

The fundamental truth in all of this is that such situations, if allowed to go unchecked, can create *two mutually exclusive intelligence apparatuses* within an organisation. Two outcomes would be likely in such circumstances. Each would be deprived of the real input and support of the other. The client organisation would thus be ultimately deprived of the *total intelligence services* it both needs and deserves.

MANAGEMENT UNDERSTANDING AND AWARENESS

As senior executives and managers change, so does an agency's consciousness and awareness levels about strategic intelligence and all it can stand for. Such changes may simply be limited to a lessening of enthusiasm, and a slow (or perhaps not-so-slow) reduction in real levels of resource support for strategic intelligence work.

From a professional intelligence standpoint, often the changes in the level of understanding and awareness of strategic intelligence concepts are arguably even more serious. They can be marked by a shift in the pattern of topic tasking operated by the agency, with a noticeable movement away from truly strategic issues requiring comprehensive and meticulous research, towards projects that have more in common with complex operational matters (and their recommendations for immediately useful operational by-products). Every time this happens, it is the agency that is the poorer - by under-achieving at the strategic end of the spectrum, in favour of enhancing input into the operational focus of activity.

It is pointless to argue with any rational decision by an agency's executive to shift resource allocation to meet changing priority needs. There is the responsibility and the authority. But making decisions in the manner described above, where the process can be based to a significant degree upon ignorance – of the real facts, their impact and the opportunities likely to be missed - is neither logical nor, in the long run, beneficial to that agency's best interests.

TIME HORIZONS

None of the foregoing observations and criticisms, however, should be confused with the very real issues of "timeliness" that now increasingly affect our entire approach to strategic intelligence servicing of an organisation.

Perhaps the least understood issue relating to the development of strategic intelligence is the time horizon that must be addressed in the forecasting process. It should be recognised that many different belief systems that have grown up in the world of intelligence concerning this issue, with the impact of polarising intelligence thought to no good end. The most common point of difference surrounds the nature of strategic intelligence and its definitional setting. One belief system suggests strategic research is only relevant to "supreme commanders" (for want of a better term) and top-ranking executives and that, in consequence, such research is meant to provide typically five or ten year outlooks.

The fact is that these "definitions" are neither accurate nor applicable universally to all users of strategic intelligence. There can be little argument with such views providing always that they are understood strictly in the context from which they stem. These opinions are based within the relatively limited framework of defence (and perhaps, at a stretch, national security) considerations. In these settings, lengthy forward warning on changing risk pictures was historically tied to the time periods needed for nations to prepare themselves to cope with threatening change.

We generally acknowledge that the development of intelligence culture in law enforcement and other related areas of government and business thinking owes its genesis to military practice. However, these historical links should not, in any way, constrain the flexibility of adapting that model to best meet enforcement requirements. Certainly the military definitional thinking about strategic intelligence as providing five-to-ten

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year (and beyond) strategic preparedness thinking cannot seriously be accepted as the norm for agencies that have to be much more pragmatic and reactive to ever-changing circumstances in the criminal environment.

The urgent and pragmatic requirements of government agencies and big business have to “drive” the application of strategic intelligence doctrine to produce strategic outlook assessments that suit their decision-making time frames. What can not be supported is the sort of inhibited thinking that suggests that the original military model discussed above is applicable in all circumstances. Plainly it is not. If, for example the enforcement community needs urgent and early warning of major change. And once warned needs to be able to react within the pragmatic constraints of budgets and resourcing issues. Then the strategic intelligence service has to devote at least a significant component of its outlook to meeting these very real user requirements. This is not to say that the long-term five and ten year outlooks about social change and criminal development are unnecessary. Rather, an equally relevant focus for strategic research must be to provide commanders (particularly field executives) with the sort of strategic warning that matches their time-frame demands. If this means intelligence units must start to provide both long and medium-term outlooks to allow for long and medium term strategy and program development, then how could one argue with such logic?

The polarisation of views mentioned previously, and the passionate arguments that accompany it, do nothing for the profession and even less in real terms for the client. It is surely time for the intelligence community to remind itself that our role is to provide service, not to adopt precious and lofty points of view that prevent this.

MANAGING THE STRATEGIC PROCESS

To the uninitiated it might seem that almost the easiest part of setting up and running a strategic intelligence service is the business of deciding what topics to explore. This is far from the truth, and although many agencies already have strong corporate-like structures that provide for a group approach to operational and intelligence planning, many others do not. In these latter circumstances, the problem that emerges is that any client may approach the strategic intelligence resource with a problem to examine. Typically, the single most important determinant of the type and amount of work that unit will undertake is often a question of “volume” and the place of a topic in “the queue” of work awaiting attention.

- This does not address the organisation’s need in any total sense; it merely deals with those clients who take the time to make an approach to the strategic intelligence service.
- What is needed is some mechanism for the organisation corporately to consider the competing ideas and requests of its senior executive clients, and determine the limits and priorities of the list of work to be transmitted to the strategic intelligence cell.
- Unless such a scheme is established, the outcomes will inevitably disappoint some clients, at least, and end up creating frustration for the strategic analysts themselves. On the other hand, any scheme to effect control over strategic tasking should not operate solely on a directive basis, that is, one that limits the strategic intelligence staff only to doing those things that are “approved”. Indeed, one of the significant strengths of strategic research is its capacity to identify useful leads for further examination, and this initiative should be applauded rather than inhibited. Fostering this sort of sense of intelligent adventurism is a key task for the close levels of supervisor/manager, and yet without it, those at the corporate peak would likely be ignorant of developing themes and prospects.

In providing these observations on developmental and implementation shortcomings in the history of applying strategic intelligence to law enforcement, the focus so far has been on the key role of managers and executives. There is one last such issue to discuss before I move on to talking about the difficulties created (or at least perpetuated) by strategic intelligence analysts themselves.

Intelligence like any other activity has to be “managed” in the broadest sense of that term, if it is to become and remain an effective pursuit. In many areas of law enforcement, the introduction of strategic intelligence

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has fostered strong expectations. These surmise that this vital, new intelligence product will illuminate issues in such a way that agencies can plan their future to cope with the good and the bad - the challenges, risks and opportunities mentioned elsewhere in this section. Strategic intelligence for law enforcement is, after all, about analysing and forecasting shifts and changes in crime patterns, in social attitudes (and societal vulnerabilities) to crime. It is about providing governments with a direct capacity to identify and take advantage of opportunities to combat or minimise or even forestall criminal enterprise.

In the case of operational intelligence, the unit and its officers and analysts operate in close proximity to their clients, who are the operational unit leaders, detectives and investigation cells and their like. Such proximity tends to facilitate the feedback mechanisms essential for guidance of that sort of intelligence effort.

Strategic intelligence presents a far more difficult challenge. While field commanders will ultimately gain some direct or indirect benefit from strategic analysis of issues, they are not the real clients of this service. An agency's senior management and executive level is the absolute client for strategic analysis. Yet, because of the nature of hierarchical structures, there will always be some "distance" in structural terms between the strategic intelligence staff at the lower end of the organisational spectrum, and the executive at the upper end.

Effective management is pivotal in making sure that executive interest in a strategic issue is able to be translated into clearly understood project tasking. The mere hierarchical "distance" between the parties must not inhibit the communication so essential between client and provider. Yet, in this context, some common problems occur.

- Often some actual physical separation of the client from the strategic project leaders and staff exists, forcing a reliance on translation of information and orders through successive layers of intermediate managers and the vagaries of communication systems and protocols. There are obvious delays in this process, with messages filtering down (and back up) between those communicating. Moreover, the time lost and the sheer effort of trying to communicate clearly without the ability to respond and react quickly brings its own sense of being "detached" from each other's reality, with the result that the work may not quite address all of the concerns of the client. On the other hand, the client may never get to properly understand exactly what might have been achieved had the communication mechanism been more able to facilitate the exchange of views so essential to planning strategic research.
- There is, also, some considerable difficulty for managers and supervisors at all levels in being able to comprehend that the interaction between client and strategic intelligence provider is a dynamic one. Both parties absolutely need to share and explore ideas and understanding not only of what is required, but the purpose to which it would be put and the opportunities and costs (in all terms) associated with specific issue study. Transmission through intermediaries creates an environment of over-simplification and potential misunderstanding that will (and does in real life) threaten the quality and usefulness of the strategic study.

PROBLEMS FOR ANALYSTS

Perhaps it is useful here to begin with a provocative view about strategic intelligence. Contrary to the opinion of some observers, who are often themselves not strategic practitioners, the author believes that strategic intelligence activity is not really "hard" to do. The techniques and mechanisms are relatively simple and generally well within the competence levels of good analysts and researchers. Conversely, if there are problems about implementing strategic intelligence programs within agencies and governments, they are problems that have little connection with intellectual difficulty of the milieu itself.

The difficulties are those of acceptance that such an intelligence service is even necessary let alone possible and practicable. The law enforcement community seems too easily capable of losing sight of some of the lessons of history, of events in which strategic analysis has played an important role in shaping the future planning of national agencies and large organisations. For whatever reason, the law enforcement environment

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seems to create its own expectations that everything can (and should) be done immediately, with outcomes that are certain or at least highly predictable over a short time-span.

One may think that this attitude is something that is the concern solely of managers and executives, but the fact is that these feelings transmit themselves all too easily to intelligence practitioners who have to live in this sort of “real world”. It is the impact of this thinking on them, and their reaction to it, which is worth considering.

For argument’s sake, that in a teaching environment we can easily get agreement from student strategic analysts that the model and techniques will work, and should be put to use. Why, then, is it that so many examples of strategic analysis and its reporting fall short of expected standards? It is now commonplace to find units and organisations in which certain strategic studies are held up as shining examples of useful input to organisational decision-making. In others the concepts, the process and the potential outcomes are scorned as being too vague, too imprecise, too far-reaching, too indirect in meeting organisational needs, and so on.

There are probably two main reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, from a management perspective the notion of “usefulness” is a shifting standard, and can change from month to month as organisational stresses increase and priorities change to address new requirements. Any strategic study project is likely to be started on the basis of assuming a certain set of interests and priorities exist. Thus, any changes to this set-up must be notified to those who are doing the analytical work, since they have the potential to affect the direction and even the entire rationale for that project.

Secondly, many analysts become influenced by managerial and client pressures for quick solutions to what are complex problems. Their solution to this dilemma is often found and solved (if such is the word) by the analyst truncating the project design, limiting the search for appropriate data, and changing the entire careful methodological approach. The purpose of doing this is to substitute a single hypothesis-driven direction to achieve desired outcomes (by management) in lieu of the more sensible, wider approach to examine all dimensions of the issues.

Certainly it cannot be argued that strategic projects are immune from normal organisational tensions of time, funds, resources and data: these are unavoidable elements of law enforcement intelligence life. If these issues create stress for the project, then the solutions that ought to be considered by the analyst must be handled in such a way as to solve the problems but nonetheless maintain a pragmatic hold on the original visions and horizons. Changing the methodological approach to a particular strategic project is not the problem; the research doctrine is quite flexible in all respects. However, when the research requirement is accompanied by any strongly directive approach (most often from clients or managers who may be acting personally or, conversely, giving voice to institutional beliefs), this will suggest answers and so inhibit real analysis in favour of justifying views already held. This sort of action-and-response cycle will almost always pervert the capacity of intelligence to produce proper research-driven outcomes.

The analyst is in an invidious position in these cases, trying to meet the genuine expectations and requirements of clients and yet being expected to ensure that balance and a sense of perspective are maintained, avoiding being led to unwarranted conclusions merely because of the client’s prejudices. In trying to deal with such pressures, it is most often the analyst personally who has to suggest corrective action and, at the same time, try to find “acceptable” ways to inform the client of the rationale for effecting change to his original directives.

The message that deserves reinforcing here is simply that the model is a useful and highly adaptable framework for tackling any strategic analysis or research project. It requires careful planning to implement it properly and effectively, and yet it is flexible enough to handle strategic issues whether they be in law enforcement or any other analytical environment. At the same time, this inherent element of flexibility should not be mistaken for meaning that parts of the process can easily be excised or substantially altered without there being some significant (and often disappointing) outcomes. As mentioned above, because the strategic project needs to be carefully planned at the outset, then the analyst should address any subsequent changes

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equally carefully. New or revised plans must be made to take account of the changed circumstances. This is no-one's responsibility but that of the analyst.

Another issue that we should recognise is the propensity of some (perhaps many) individual analysts to turn their new-found responsibilities and skills for strategic analysis into something of a permanent, specialised job that could be misinterpreted as relieving them of the bothers of daily office routine.

Perhaps it is based in the institutionalised uniqueness or elitism of strategic intelligence that seems to pervade some organisations (mentioned earlier) but, whatever the reason, many analysts can be observed to act as if their responsibilities are solely tied to the development of long-term assessments. In these units, the staff can often actively discourage any attempt to have them report regularly on their progress or to utilise their growing specialised knowledge on specific issues to answer questions or provide briefings. Instead, such personnel operate as if an assignment to strategic intelligence is tantamount to gaining permission to become involved in academic research, free of the tensions and demands of organisational demands except in the very broadest sense. While one might imagine that this is a very individual phenomenon, there are certainly whole units devoted to strategic analysis where these models of behaviour are the norm rather than the exception.

SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

This summary section serves as a quick reminder of some of the elements of strategic intelligence practice and application that have either "gone wrong" or at least have strayed from the path of sensible, *best practice*. These are all issues that can and should be improved if organisations are to acquire what should be a serious and effective strategic assessment support service. I have chosen to write them up as specific recommendations for change or reinforcement.

1. Place emphasis on ensuring that managers and other organisational clients develop a strong awareness of the use of strategic analysis as a fundamental tool for future planning and decision-making;
2. Task and use strategic intelligence and operational intelligence in such a way that they complement each other, rather than compete for resources and attention.
3. Structure and place the strategic intelligence unit or cell so that its location in the organisation does not distance it from would-be clients and consumers of the product, or other intelligence functions.
4. Administer strategic intelligence with sensitivity to avoid any misplaced sense of elitism or behavioural arrogance.
5. Establish workable tasking mechanisms to ensure that strategic intelligence resources are applied to issues of genuine concern and importance to the organisation's role and responsibilities.
6. Continue to provide expert strategic intelligence training not only to practitioners, but adapted to suit the awareness needs of other intelligence officers and of supervisors, managers and executives.
7. Ensure that analysts and clients work together to conduct projects in such a way that, even where substantial changes are required to earlier plans and expectations, then both cooperate to develop revised project plans that still achieve organisational needs.
8. Encourage supervisors and managers to oversight strategic assessment projects to provide a continuing level of input of necessary information, guidance and leadership.
9. Ensure that analysts follow the logical processes taught in strategic intelligence training, and apply these to all strategic problem solving issues, flexibly adapting them to suit specific project needs.

CONCLUSION

The 1990s have seen a remarkable breakthrough in gaining endorsement for strategic intelligence and analysis practice within the world's law enforcement community. Naturally, progress is both slow and patchy, since this relatively new tool takes time to be accepted fully by organisations that do not have an existing, strong involvement in intelligence analysis work. What is important, though, is that the ideas have taken root, and implementation is slowly but surely following.

However, there are already some serious lessons that we can learn about using strategic analysis. We need to find the strength to commit ourselves to a strategy of remedial action - one that would involve increased, better publicity, further training and familiarisation for practitioners and their managers, and a sense of vigilance to ensure quality control over the strategic products being produced. If not, then our profession is in some danger of having this essential, exciting technique become devalued and marginalised. A lot of criticism directed towards strategic intelligence even now, at this relatively early stage, is born of ignorance of what it is and how it should work.

As intelligence professionals, we simply cannot divorce ourselves from responsibility for such criticism. Frankly, no one else will fix these situations, and we need to take a strong hand in showing how better to do things and achieve useful strategic results. The inescapable thing is successful law enforcement simply must have strategic assessment as a tool. It is up to us, individually and collectively, to make it work.

**EXAMINING WILDLIFE CRIME AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR AUSTRALIA⁶
CONDUCTING POLICY-RELEVANT STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
(1993)**

SUMMARY

This paper describes a strategic study being undertaken at the time of presentation, into the arena of wildlife crime, policy and the law. The study originally began as a strategic probe into only the dimensions and nature of wildlife crime, that is, crime against both native flora and fauna and any threat posed by the introduction of exotic species. At an early stage in scanning the topic, it became evident that the research needed to probe crime and its relationship to public expectations and understanding, government policy making and implementation, and the body of law affecting directly and indirectly upon these issues. The paper was an interim report to an international meeting of wildlife enforcement specialists.

*In the event, the outcome of this research was the publication in 1997 of a book entitled *WILDLIFE CRIME, POLICY AND THE LAW : AN AUSTRALIAN STUDY*⁷.*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years it has become increasingly fashionable to focus some part of the overall intelligence effort, in justice administration and law enforcement, on issues of a strategic nature, rather than maintain an exclusive and traditional preoccupation with operational support activities. This change has brought its own challenges to intelligence practice - to develop appropriate doctrine and techniques, to find and train intelligence practitioners to carry out these tasks, and to educate executive and corporate management opinion, expectation and leadership.

Adapting intelligence practice to issues of wider implication has not been easy, nor have the early outcomes been necessarily successful in all respects. Traditional intelligence practice, for all its difficulties, enjoys the advantage of producing outcomes for clearly identifiable purposes - to satisfy the needs of the client managers.

Strategic intelligence is certainly applicable at an agency level, where its role is to satisfy corporate managers with pointers to future threat, risk or opportunity; but it is equally capable of being sought by much larger client audiences than single agencies. As the issues involved often expand into a multiplicity of jurisdictional interest areas and across agency and geographical boundaries, so too do the obligations and responsibilities of the strategic intelligence practitioners.

In this way, it is often the case that the development of strategic research and analysis projects create a situation in which there is no clear, singular client, simply because the analysis of impact and opportunity cross into many different areas of responsibility.

Planning and implementing an intelligence project in these circumstances presents special, and often unforeseen, challenges and difficulties. What was originally intended and designed can easily undergo change to its focus and magnitude. Issues that appeared clear-cut can, with time to conduct in-depth research, become provocative rather than simplistic, comprehensive rather than uncomplicated.

⁶ This paper Presented to the Wildlife Enforcement Seminar in Auckland, New Zealand, September 1993, by the author Don McDowell
⁷ (Don McDowell. Environment Australia 1997, AGPS, Australia. ISBN 0644 47611 7)

This Case Study

The case study presented briefly in this paper concerns an in-depth strategic study project. What commenced with a simple idea, the examination of wildlife crime in Australia from a strategic perspective, developed logically and inescapably into a study into issues of much larger magnitude. In the paper that follows, these issues and their impact on the planning and implementation of the strategic intelligence project, are described.

BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT - THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE TOPIC

Australia has a unique heritage in its wildlife - so much so, that it has become enshrined in our national symbols, our folklore and our natural history. Indeed, the rest of the world has come to know and recognise us through key wildlife symbols. In this sense, our native fauna and flora are much prized, their uniqueness making them a national asset on a monetary as well as a sentimental plane.

The precious quality of Australia's wildlife has meant, however, that it has become increasingly vulnerable to a thriving illicit trade established for financial gain, putting this unique asset at risk.

From a range of perspectives, therefore, it makes considerable sense to secure the welfare of our wildlife. To this end, the relevant federal, state and territory authorities play a co-operative role in monitoring the welfare of native fauna and flora.

To achieve this, Australia has a matrix of legislative control mechanisms that govern access, the taking, trapping, keeping, breeding, displaying and trading in fauna and flora. Behind these endeavours lies a web of government policies that gives effect to what are considered to be the national objectives in these matters. But, in fact, Australia does not act alone on the questions of wildlife care and management, and at least some of the philosophical basis for existing policies stems from perceptions of our obligations as part of the wider, international community of wildlife carers.

In an issue of this magnitude, it is an important principle that all of the features of the policy setting be comprehensively canvassed and properly examined, analysed and evaluated. Without such a process (whatever the topic), it is just not possible for major policy issues to be appropriately decided. That is, the process of conducting policy-relevant research is an essential pre-requisite to the formation of objective policies designed to act in the best interests of all concerned. So is this also true of the advisability of reviewing existing policies, from time to time, to gauge the impact upon them of changing circumstances.

THE OBJECTIVES AND PARAMETERS OF THE STRATEGIC STUDY

The assessment of the illegal trade in wildlife in this country encompasses all its attendant issues. It is intended, therefore, as a serious examination of the whole topic setting, and not one which merely sets out to focus solely on the details of particular cases of illicit activity. The assessment is very definitely not intended, therefore, to titillate the reader with inside stories of crime and misdeed.

Instead, the assessment provides a substantial view of the problems involved in establishing and maintaining responsible management and care for native (and other) wildlife. It looks at various competing policy options, and examines, necessarily, the impact of crime and wrong-doing within existing wildlife policies and controls, as well as the relationship between crime and policy in this arena. The point of this approach is to provide the reader with a useful frame of reference for careful thought and consideration of wildlife issues, and to provoke discussion about wildlife policies, programs and strategies in this country.

The project had its beginnings in 1991. At a seminar on wildlife law enforcement in Adelaide, the author (then a senior officer of the Federal Justice Office on secondment to the Australian Institute of Criminology) formally proposed that a major strategic study of wildlife and crime should be undertaken. The purpose of such an assessment was not only to illuminate the nature and extent of wildlife crime, but to form a beneficial backdrop to wildlife policy formulation and legislative review, an on-going process in almost all of the jurisdictions represented at that forum. The seminar in 1991 unanimously endorsed the conduct of this

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strategic study, acknowledging that while the Institute and the author would be solely responsible for undertaking the work involved, each involved agency would commit itself to providing the information input necessary to the project.

The reasons behind proposing this study arose from a perceived need, within the political and official arms of government, to gain a better understanding of wildlife crime, its antecedents, impact and the challenge it poses. Such a study, it was thought, would take into account not only the interests of enforcement authorities, but would also consider the wider interests of security of our wildlife population. At that time, it was observed (and, since then, confirmed) that, within the framework of existing national wildlife policies, legislation and practice - no matter how sensible we might traditionally have thought them to be - there was still some continuing measure of inconsistency, confusion, lack of understanding, disquiet and disagreement. Indeed, that is still the situation today, in late 1993.

All of these features affect not only those government personnel involved in implementing wildlife care and management programs, but impact on both the public at large and upon the "industry" associated with wildlife matters.

Certainly, compliance with existing regulations and the various sets of "rules" about wildlife management remains a problem for all concerned - involved private citizens and government authorities alike. However, of much greater concern, is the fact that there is a wealth of information and evidence, both historical and continuing, that describes not only the failure of individuals to conform with the requirements of the structured compliance framework, but points clearly to a serious level of on-going, deliberate, organised criminal endeavour. This latter is commonly held to be particularly threatening because it has the capacity to substantially weaken our wildlife asset; not just because the illegal wildlife "trade" removes, forever, part of that asset for private gain, but, in doing so, the removal operations themselves can affect the "natural" environment surrounding wildlife breeding and living patterns. This, in turn, has a potential impact well beyond the mere reduction in fauna and flora species and numbers.

DETERMINING THE PROJECT DIRECTIVE

The original directive for the study was deliberately set in broad terms. It assigned a mandate that permitted the widest possible scope for examination of wildlife crime and associated problems.

The project directive calls for an estimate of the "nature and extent" of wildlife crime. This has been assessed partly through the gathering of those data collected by all the jurisdictions. What remains missing from enforcement information systems, of course, is data about those crimes that have not been the subject of enforcement investigations, seizures, arrests or prosecutions. In other words, the available hard data about crime concerns only that which we, as a society, have encountered and dealt with. This is a predictable observation, and the statement could easily be taken as something of a truism when describing almost any crime in the context of its interaction with enforcement. For most crimes, the ever-present issue is one of assuming that "what we see" is symptomatic of the whole.

But there is an important distinction to be made about wildlife crime as a unique category. It is that rarely are there any reliable indications that the crime has occurred unless there is some clue or clear information provided by persons or agencies external to those involved in the commission of the crime. Wildlife crime is, to a large degree, an unseen crime, because unlike property theft or personal injury, native fauna and flora are largely unobserved in their natural state. It is this latter point about wildlife crime that is particularly germane to the understanding of why this illegal activity continues unabated and mainly away from view - it is that there are, in fact, no obvious crime victims for society to notice, and there are not necessarily any clear signs of impact on other elements of the environment or the community itself.

Indeed, since there is little knowledge about the continuing status of our wildlife population, it is almost impossible to know whether or not wild fauna or flora have been stolen or damaged until the issue finally comes to public or official notice, often when it is too late for any meaningful intervention.

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Understanding these difficulties, and by using an all-embracing approach to the research, the study was able to shift its focus from time to time. As perceptions changed and various hypotheses evolved, these, in turn, provided opportunities to refine the focus of the project. Thus it was possible to examine issues that increasingly moved on beyond merely looking at the incidence and nature of wildlife crime, into what can now be clearly seen as the more policy-relevant issue: the nexus between the philosophy underpinning wildlife policy, the control policies and associated regulatory mechanisms thus established, and the opportunities inevitably created for disobedience, misbehaviour and deliberate crime.

Using this approach of setting a "total" context around the topic of wildlife crime, follows what is a growing practice within enforcement and justice administration circles: to carry out a truly strategic analysis of the topic, avoiding the tight focus and (perhaps) superficiality of past "snapshots" of crime problems undertaken by or for the law enforcement agencies. The broadening of the study's parameters at the outset was deliberate in its attempt to allow the widest possible exploration of all aspects surrounding the question of wildlife crime.

The intent was, of course, to look at the incidence of crime, but in a way that allowed thorough examination of the wildlife milieu, the motivators and the facilitating conditions for illegality. The emphasis was on setting the view of wildlife crime against a much broader canvas encompassing an understanding of the law, its intent, the underlying policies, and the views and beliefs of the community.

EXPLORING THE SETTING - THE LAW AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

The study is about a very particular Australian national asset - our wildlife. It is about crime and related illegal activity that affects wildlife and, at its most basic level, the study examines the wide range of issues that concern the protection and conservation of wild fauna (animals) and flora (plants) from theft, cruelty, misuse, abuse, damage or death, where these activities are brought about by human intervention or behaviour.

In looking at wildlife and crime, and exploring the relationship between the two, a fundamental issue for the study is to determine whether the illegalities that occur are, universally, really "criminal". It could not be simply assumed that all acts that were "unlawful" (as defined within the relevant legislation) should be treated with equal weight - as crime - and counted, patterned and assessed without delineation. The study, in later passages, examines this question in some depth because, for many in the community, "wildlife crime" is an all-embracing notion that tends to focus on the smuggling of animals (particularly), with its overtones of cruelty. This image assigns to all the acts and the players the appellation of "criminal".

Rightly or wrongly, by believing that all acts that threaten the conservation and protection of wildlife are indeed criminal, there is a danger of over-simplifying a milieu that deserves a much more careful examination. In fact, much of the popular literature that deals with the threat to wildlife focuses on this particular dimension: the criminality and cruelty involved, and the emotional impact upon those who observe and react to their knowledge of such acts.

The phenomenon of social reaction and (it might be argued) over-reaction is certainly not confined to the wildlife issue. It is possible to observe a widening range of activities that, when they provide deep offence in some way, have the effect of provoking a reaction that assumes and asserts that "such and such behaviour" is likewise held to be "criminal". Even just recognising that this sort of reaction can occur is, itself, important; this is because the impact these sorts of emotions can inhibit the development of any more comprehensive understanding of behaviour that may be illegal, aberrant or even merely socially undesirable. Wildlife crime is definitely not an exceptional topic in this regard.

Neither do the commonly-held, simple definitions and images of wildlife crime help the process of understanding the topic. In fact, they will almost certainly hinder it to the extent that deeper consideration remains constrained by the overlaid images, sentiment and emotionalism surrounding the topic. In order to comprehend the issues in a way that would facilitate the review and development of better policies, (which is, after all, the function of this study and report), it is first essential to recognise (and hopefully rid ourselves of)

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the simplistic, narrowly-based and attention-getting images that are created whenever issues of wildlife illegality are publicised.

Understandably, many people in the community, the wildlife industry and affinity organisations, as well as in the media, saw the original purpose of this study being simply to focus on theft and smuggling of wildlife, both out of and into this country, believing that the study of these activities would involve "criminals". In fact, the focus, instead, has been to look at the total asset - the population of existing wild fauna and flora species - from a much wider set of perspectives.

The following questions were all considered to be fundamental to the whole issue of examining illegal trafficking in wildlife, and relating the analysis to the purpose of reviewing existing policies:

- what policies and values govern our national and state controls over native animal and plant life ?
- why ?
- how have such policies come into being ?
- what objectives and goals are in place (or at least desired) by the various government authorities involved ?
- what are the attitudes, activities and involvement of the fauna and flora industry in this country ?
- what are public values and belief systems concerning fauna and flora ?
- do these attitudes have an impact on crime, and do they also have some effect on the development of government control policies ?

It is important, too, to recognise that even the word "wildlife" itself is one that can have different shades of meaning to suit differing contexts and it has been important to use (or develop) appropriate definitional concepts for use throughout the study, as follows.

1. The term wildlife has been taken, in this study, to include all animals and plants (alive or dead and including their parts, products and derivatives in any form), native to Australia.
2. In addition, the scope of fauna and flora considered has included not only native species, but those that are foreign to Australia - species that have been, are being and will probably continue to be transported here, whether legally or illegally. There is, thus, a deliberate examination of the issues surrounding exotic species in a separate part of the report.
3. Quite fundamental to the treatment of wildlife illegality, the assessment recognises that there exists a strong perception that there is a distinction between non-compliance and crime, although both categories clearly represent illegal action. For the former, the context favoured throughout the report is that non-compliance includes (and is assumed to be generally limited to) acts that contravene permit regulations and their like, and which include both witting or unwitting disobedience of the rule systems. Individual wrong-doers are key to this sort of illegal or unauthorised activity, although more than one person may obviously be involved in any single enterprise or offence.
4. Crime, on the other hand, is taken in this report to reflect the perception of a more serious dimension of illegality. Crime involves a deliberate and purposeful chain of illegal activity for which personal gain (for example, through sale or possession of the wildlife commodity), is the principal motivation. The features of wildlife crime are that, more often than not, it involves a number of players, they are knowingly committing illegal acts in concert, they act according to a plan that will usually include financial and physical organisation, transportation of stolen (poached, trapped) or otherwise illegally-obtained wildlife, and eventually movement to intended markets.

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5. Control mechanisms to provide legal access to wildlife (that is, for fanciers, keepers, breeders and dealers) are established and operated by the various federal and state authorities. Each agency has some responsibilities to monitor and enforce the regulations. This action - enforcement - may include investigation and analysis of both regulatory breaches and crime, intelligence work associated with examining information concerning activities and persons involved in illegalities, and consequent prosecution action. The wildlife enforcement community includes national parks, wildlife, environment and like agencies, together with Customs, Quarantine and the various police forces. Each agency has its own quite specific legislative and enforcement responsibilities, and these roles and responsibilities are described later.

WRONG-DOERS OR CRIMINALS ?

One issue central to this study has been the task of trying to see clear distinctions in the way existing wildlife law sees - and treats - those who are involved in offences, as opposed to public perceptions of the same activities.

There can be little doubt that, for the most part, Australian society has a firm view about those who commit wildlife offences involving cruelty to animals: the offence and the offender are regarded with contempt, and the victims with compassion (sometimes arguably out of all proportion when compared with human suffering). In this setting, public values and the law are together.

Conversely, there exists a wide range (and huge number) of offences being committed on a continuing basis, involving transgression of the systems of permits and licences operated by each state or territory government. Though categorised as illegal by the legislation, it is not unusual for these acts to be regarded by the public and the wildlife "industry" with something approaching benign tolerance, even disinterest. In this sector of illegal behaviour, there is a discernible element of public opinion that seems coloured by a perverse disagreement with the system of rules designed to protect and control the very commodity otherwise held in high sentimental regard.

Among the several possible reasons for this dichotomy of views, advanced by contributors to this study, the principal one stands out strongly. In essence, the law governing the keeping and breeding of wild fauna and flora is often seen by those affected to be a collection of what has been described as "petty rules, arbitrarily implemented", designed to impair the freedom of individuals to practice their hobbyist fauna or flora activity. This perception drives a code of behaviour that, for many, devalues conformity with the rules established by governments, and therefore tends to form the basis for excusing behaviour (particularly one's own) that does not follow the package of rules and regulations. Fundamental to this view is the belief that the systems of rules provides little encouragement to real and caring wildlife enthusiasts. While the belief system is certainly not held universally, it does operate widely enough to ensure that, for many people, they view non-conformist behaviour not as illegal but as "clever" or "sharp". For them, it is the law that needs to be changed to reflect prevailing public opinion (as they see it), not the behaviour.

Wildlife enthusiasts genuinely endorse the vigour with which government enforcement agencies prosecute those involved in smuggling Australian wildlife out of the country and, as stated earlier, public reaction is no less supportive. Offenders, in these cases, are clearly regarded as criminals. But the end result of the shift in attitude, described above, concerning offences against the regulations and government permit controls regarding the keeping of domestic fauna and flora, is that there appears to be a significant proportion of the involved population which does not regard such offences as criminal, merely examples of "wrong-doing", and thus not particularly serious.

It should be of concern to law-makers everywhere that there exists this ability to not only disagree with existing law, but differentiate between shades of misdeed and, in doing so, give tacit endorsement to what nonetheless is unlawful behaviour. This issue is taken up in more detail later in the study.

POLICIES AND COMMITMENT OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS

A reading of the various pieces of wildlife legislation enacted by Australian authorities, at whatever jurisdictional level, will confirm that wildlife control issues generate serious concern by all parties involved.

During the study, it became quickly obvious that although the tenor of the separate acts and regulations all seemed to promote the idea of common intent, shared by all governments, implementation policies and practice suggested that wildlife matters do not necessarily always attract sufficient organisational, political or financial support. Each wildlife agency sets (or has set for it) priorities and policies applicable to its own operating circumstances. There are several obvious factors involved in setting the regional scene, for example: local beliefs about the "importance" of wildlife or environmental issues generally; the perceived usefulness of enforcement activities within the wildlife departments; budget disputes over the apportioning of funds between "conservationist" versus "protectionist" measures.

Overall management of wildlife assets within each state and territory reflects these difficulties, with some agencies barely able to provide sufficient enforcement resources to carry out basic control checks, and yet others given wide powers and support to engage in quasi-police operations against offenders of wildlife law.

In sum, it is worth observing that while the laws provide a framework that suggests a level of commonality of approach among all the levels of government in this country, the translation of those laws into action, and the empowering of such action with real support, is much more uneven. While there is a great deal of logic to the non-involvement of police forces in enforcing wildlife matters (except, notably, in Queensland), this unfortunately seems to have reinforced the idea that wildlife enforcement is, perhaps, less "serious" than crimes against people or property - a notion hardly surprising, but not really tenable given the wider popular feeling that Australia's wildlife are a national asset.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT

While strategic intelligence practice will almost always call upon various techniques and skills used in standard intelligence practice, there are difficulties peculiar to the conduct of research into such broad issues, difficulties that challenge intelligence officers to adopt much more flexible approaches to collecting and analysing the data required.

From the beginning of the project, it was clear that this study would have to examine issues for which there was little available "hard" information. In understanding wildlife crime, the range of features that need to be viewed and analysed goes well beyond the types of measurable data that are generally collected, for one purpose or another, by the various interest groups and authorities. It is a feature of law enforcement operations that information about both the incidence and methodology of crime is routinely gathered by each responsible agency as part of its intelligence and investigative effort. Thus, enforcement organisations within the federal, state and territory governments each collect data relevant to its role in dealing with wildlife issues. In this context, the enforcement role is shared by police, customs and the various parks and wildlife organisations at all jurisdictional levels.

In addition to obvious crime-related data, each of these agencies collects, collates and analyses information concerning licence and permit infringements. The intention in doing so is not only to enhance the agency's ability to monitor its own permit system, but to use the infringement information as input to contribute to the more specific crime-oriented investigative casework.

The information-gathering activities of law enforcement groups, be they at state, territory or federal levels, are all understandably somewhat similar. Each agency collects data according to its jurisdictional responsibilities. Thus, in the federal arena, Commonwealth agencies collect crime information with an obvious focus on activities where the illegality is concerned with the smuggling of Australian native wildlife overseas, as well as the detection of attempts to smuggle exotica into Australia. Understandably, the focus of state and territory wildlife enforcement groups is on maintaining order within jurisdictional boundaries,

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ensuring the security and control of wildlife both in the natural environment and in the hands of permit-holding citizens. Information collected by these agencies tends to relate to criminal acts and incidents of non-compliance within that jurisdiction.

Each federal, state and territory agency with a stake in wildlife enforcement was visited during the study, and arrangements made to access their investigation and intelligence data. As will become obvious within the material presented in Chapter 4, for the most part these information banks contained material concerned mostly with cases of non-compliance, since criminal cases form an important but tiny minority of the total workload.

The material accessed was in the form of typical police investigation file notes plus summary data contained on computerised databases used by the particular enforcement agency. This latter information gave the capacity for agency activities and results to be tabulated and analysed for trends; the investigation file information was more useful in pointing to patterns of activity, types of target wildlife, methodologies used in the crime, features common to certain types of offenders, and so on. The distinction between the two types of data was, as expected, that the database information was measurable and able to be statistically correlated and analysed; file data contained, inevitably, not only hard information about the crime and the offenders, but qualitative and descriptive data of equal use in understanding the crime concerned.

A particular challenge for this study was to be able to tap into the vast amount of anecdotal, descriptive, qualitative information available within the enforcement community - as well as the wildlife "industry" - to describe views and opinions held on almost every aspect of the terms of reference. In every field of investigative activity, it has long been practice to accept the usefulness of qualitative data in pointing up possible theories; but there has always been a tendency to focus strongly on measurable, provable information to make a case based on reliable "evidence". The task facing intelligence research and analysis (and, assumedly, other forms of social study) is more complex: evidentiary data is no longer the preoccupation, and the outcome is not a prosecution but a working hypothesis, able to point the way towards useful action. In this setting, qualitative data is arguably as important as hard information, if only by way of recognition that hard information is not easy to come by early enough to be able to hypothesise and plan ahead.

During the planning stage, it came to be understood that one reason no such wide-ranging analysis of the wildlife crime problem had ever been done before was that there was (and always has been) a dearth of hard data on which to build a "traditional" assessment of the situation. Certainly law enforcement and wildlife agencies possessed information about the types of crimes they came in contact with, but this data was neither sufficient nor detailed enough (nor was it maintained in consistent form across the country) to be confident that it represented the true picture of wildlife crime issues.

It was confidently believed, however, that by overcoming traditional misgivings about descriptive data and accepting input from "soft", as well as "hard" data, substantial progress could be made in describing the national wildlife crime situation, even though such a description was unlikely to result in useful estimates of the magnitude and costs of such crime. Therefore, during the contact with the wildlife enforcement agencies in each jurisdiction, equal weight was placed on gathering database and file information, as well as on conducting interviews with a large number of experienced officers, seeking their educated opinions. These individuals gave freely of their time during what were, most often, quite lengthy and far-ranging interviews. The sessions were structured to cover the fields of interest inherent in the terms of reference, but were always localised to the particular agency or geographical area in which the interview took place. By so doing, participants were encouraged to talk about what they knew or suspected from a personal and familiar frame of reference, rather than speculating upon the wider issues outside of their ken.

The interviewing technique was extended to members of the public, as well as with representatives of non-government groups and associations with a keen interest in wildlife matters. This group of people had little hard information to offer, but were often specialists in wildlife matters and could comment helpfully on those matters in which they had particular interest. Thus, people with specific concerns about animal cruelty, invasion of habitat areas, the impact of primary industry practices on the wild, and so on, all came forward to make their contributions to the study.

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As a matter of methodological approach, it is worth noting that a specific goal of the project plan was to establish and maintain extensive contact with representatives of the media, as a means of generating public awareness and gaining access to a potentially wider audience within the community, all intended to assist in the collection of anecdotal and descriptive data. This element of the plan worked well and may be both useful and appropriate in other strategic study activities.

The result of collecting both the officially-recorded data as well as the impressionistic information gathered through the interview process, was a collection of information that pointed to and described the many features of wildlife crime. This information, arriving gradually over several months, was evaluated and interpreted in such a way as to develop several working hypotheses that were, in turn, being continually checked, corrected and fine-tuned as the collection process continued.

Throughout the entire process particular emphasis was paid to protecting both the information and the sources from public view and, for that reason alone, this study report contains no mention of persons, places or dates. Indeed, it was a condition of access to information and individuals that this level of sensitivity be observed. What might appear to be working constraints in fact had little impact on the process: all data available to agencies was freely given and open to rigorous evaluation and interpretation. It has only been in the report-writing phase that the conclusions reached have had to be "sanitised" to remove traceable detail from them - a small price to pay for gaining access to official and personal information on a very wide scale. Depending upon the client and the intended (or likely) distribution of the intelligence product, this is certainly not an issue unfamiliar to experienced intelligence officers.

One other issue deserves recognition: the impossibility of estimating the size of the crime problem. As a result, it has not been possible, therefore, to evaluate the crime impact in measurable terms. It has been possible, however, to describe the many features of wildlife crime in a manner that should positively aid the process of reviewing and evaluating Australia's wildlife policies, strategies and programs.

AN OVERVIEW : CLIENTS, EXPECTATIONS AND LIKELY OUTCOMES

At the outset, during the process of gaining endorsement of the project concept from the assembled representatives of the wildlife law enforcement community, there were widely-held expectations within that group that the project would result in a relatively simple exposure of wildlife crime and its magnitude. The assumptions, occasionally expressed by members of that fraternity, were that the report would focus on crime in such a way as to support those agencies in their claims for attention and support from their respective governments.

As shown in this paper, while it would have been possible to adopt an approach that merely described situations and aggregated the incidence of crime, nothing in this would have really illuminated anything useful in terms of determining what could be done about it.

The decision to conduct a full environmental scan of the topic - the concepts, public perceptions, legal implications, social attitudes and the myriad other aspects - was inspired by the need to address the study towards achieving a useful outcome. In this respect, serving agency needs for supportive information and intelligence was deemed to be too limited in its thinking. The end result was no accident; it was the result of careful thought about addressing the widest possible audience and dealing with all the relevant issues to produce what is intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the topic in all its aspects.

No single client would have suited this project, and as the project plan-cum-directive was being developed, it also became obvious that this would become a project intended as an exercise *pro bono publico*, avoiding any particular bias (good or bad) that might have been imparted through working towards one agency or other.

In the end, the product should provide greater - not less - support, succour and encouragement to all the potential would-be clients and consumers, including the public, because of this very feature.

The specific challenge for a strategic intelligence practitioner in this case, as in all others, is to be prepared to move away from the rigid, the ordinary and the predictable features of what might be called "quantitative

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intelligence", and explore problem issues in all their aspects. Hard information is not, by any means, unvalued or under-valued; but it is not the total picture. Strategic studies are as much concerned with motivators and impacts, intended or otherwise, as they are with measurable outcomes.

Surely this is obvious. If the end result is to inform the decision-making process, then the fuller the picture given, the more likely it is that balance will be achieved in the process of considering policy options. This is the particular service that strategic intelligence - after all, just another name for applied research and analysis - can offer decision-makers.

LAW ENFORCEMENT DECISION MAKING THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS⁸

(1993)

SUMMARY

This paper comments on the use of applied research and analysis (another way of looking at the term “strategic intelligence”) and its use in formulating policy and making decisions about enforcement programs and strategies

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to explain the rationale for strategic intelligence development in support of law enforcement planning and decision making and to review progress towards meeting the objective of establishing acceptance of “best practice” in this field. Some brief background comments are relevant to these issues

Since the late 1980s there has been growing interest, within government planning circles everywhere, in establishing formal long-term plans and objectives for the delivery of public services to government and the community. In part, this reflects a general world-wide movement towards acceptance of the benefits in developing long- range strategic plans for business and industry. This trend, in time, spread to government organisations and it is common practice, now, for all governments and their public sector departments to establish and focus on individual and collective strategic plans.

While industry organisations ultimately have to report their performance to their owners, stockholders and investors, some government organisations have traditionally been able to avoid or at least minimise their obligations to report progress. The imposition, by political arms of government, of strategic plans and objectives on government public sector departments has, at last, set in place defined performance goals against which these agencies are now expected to account for their levels of activity, successes and failures. this applies as much in the federal arena as it does at state and local levels.

This new pressure to not only to perform better, but also to be seen to be capable of effectively planning any activity right from the outset, clearly stems from increasing public expectations of more accountability in the actions and expenditure of all government organisations. Such expectations of better performance and increased accountability are by no means limited to government departments though, and even political parties and individual figures are themselves coming increasingly under similar scrutiny.

In this climate of “reform” the law enforcement community is no exception to this phenomenon.

Yet, on the other hand, it has often been argued that law enforcement is a reactive activity and therefore one in which forward planning is neither possible or desirable. Not “possible” because of the changing nature of crime; nor “desirable,” lest published plans indicate future policing strategies and programs, allowing them to be thwarted by criminal elements.

In fact, neither argument is persuasive, as will be seen in this paper.

⁸ Don McDowell. *International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts Inc. IALEIA Journal*, vol. 8 no. 2, February 1994, Miami, USA. This was a paper presented at the IALEIA Annual Conference in St. Louis, MO, in October, 1993.

PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING

If managing law enforcement organisations involves making choices--about priorities, focus, resource distribution, training and the like-- then it is fundamental to the success of that process that such choices be made in an informed environment. Managers at all levels attempt to make the best decisions possible in all circumstances and it is this latter phrase-- in all circumstances-- that holds the key to understanding the logical links between *information*, *intelligence* and *decision making*.

We are all familiar with the traditional role of intelligence services in the law enforcement milieu: it is principally one of providing tactical leads and direction to the operational arms of the police agencies and their counterparts in other areas of justice and compliance; customs, immigration, wildlife protection, and the like. Although some agencies may not necessarily see that it is essential to formalise the establishment of intelligence units (often based on their size), the fact is that activities take place involving the collection and interpretation of information; activities that are, for all intents and purposes, intelligence functions whatever their title. Whatever the circumstances, the role of tactical support intelligence is rarely challenged. Indeed, if there are problems for intelligence they rest not with the legitimacy of its functioning at this level, but with more petty issues of credit and gratitude for work that turns out to have direct value to operational activities.

It is obvious why intelligence at this level is supported: our tactical functions have a direct link to outcomes that are both tangible and--in this age of accountability--measurable as performance indicators for the operational agency concerned.

Decisions about how to use our enforcement resources, and where, and when, and against which emerging threats, are not, however, tactical decisions. It is clear and unarguable that managers at all levels need a high level of awareness of current issues and future possibilities if they are involved in making decisions affecting policies and programs of enforcement agencies, and expect to make the "right" decisions. The logical issue that arises from this is that if policy choices are expected to drive sensible force development and focus, then how can decision-makers operate without due consideration of the range of issues involved?

The fact is that most senior managers in any work environment would simply assert that their role of decision-making is indeed exercised after the "due consideration" process, but it takes little investigation to establish that the process, if performed in any recognisable form at all, is more often than not likely to have been undertaken in a relatively unstructured way.

It may not be exactly a truism of current management practice, but the following statements describe a situation all too commonly observable in enforcement organisations:

- before gaining management approval, tactical and operational decisions demand demonstrably careful and detailed planning by junior and line staff:
- higher level planning may, on the other hand, be done in relative isolation by senior managers acting on disparate and un-integrated advice from various petitioners and advisors, with those managers often taking considerable account of their own experience and perceived individual wisdom

What is needed, instead, is a commitment to clever, more organised approaches to planning and decision-making at executive levels and, in this, there is a clear role for intelligence practice to contribute to the process by providing the research and interpretation of existing circumstances and to forecast changes and challenges.

PROVIDING A STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE INPUT

In very recent years, many law enforcement agencies, as well as their parent government justice departments, have become apprised and often truly convinced of this need for better analysis surrounding major decision-making issues. It is not surprising that the agencies, themselves, avoided seeking better under-pinning of the

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policy and program decision process until recent times. After all, senior management and corporate executives have maintained faith in their powers of decision-making as part of the management culture that traditionally prevails.

What *is* surprising is that the intelligence profession, itself, waited so long before it involved itself in trying to effect change. Despite the long and historical associations of intelligence practice with the development of strategic plans in the areas of defense and international relations, the move to establish strategic intelligence within law enforcement (and in other areas of government planning) is comparatively recent. Indeed, it is only within the last three years that enforcement organisations in the major English-speaking communities have even addressed the issue in any deliberate way; and yet the need for strategic research and capacity have always existed.

Whatever the reasons behind such slow acceptance of change, what now exists, after considerable research and innovation, is a substantial body of doctrine and teaching on strategic intelligence methodology, and a small but gradually increasing amount of strategic intelligence practice throughout the international enforcement community.

DOCTRINE AND TEACHING

Let us consider, first, the doctrine and teaching. Both the doctrine and the training emphasise the care and thought essential in planning and subsequent processes of strategic intelligence activity. But more fundamental is the emphasis on empowering intelligence officers to gain confidence in their ability to tackle issues for which the breadth of scope is bound to lead to less precision in forecasts, at the same time placing greater value and reliance upon personal knowledge, expertise and judgment of the issues under examination.

This clearly sets strategic intelligence practice apart from that involved in supporting tactical and operational activities, since in these latter cases intelligence, investigation, evidence, and prosecution are all somewhat inter-twined. Consider, for example, just how much traditional investigative and detective work shares techniques that are recognisable as those familiar in intelligence training--collection, collation, evaluation and interpretation-- but applied with an evidence gathering focus.

There is, therefore, an essential difference between the way in which these differing applications of intelligence are taught, stemming from the very differences between the two dimensions of intelligence practice. Tactical intelligence requires a capacity to deal with information in what is often a rapidly changing environment, always driven by a need to provide timely leads and targets for immediate operational response. Strategic intelligence has to be accepted for what it is-- a more comprehensive look at an array of often quite disparate, incomplete and unfamiliar data, all requiring considerable skill in developing hypotheses about events, trends and potentialities that, of their very nature, defy precision.

Yet, for all the imprecision involved in strategic analysis, without even this imperfect level of educated, structured and disciplined “crystal- ball gazing,” proper planning and effective decision- making is just simply not possible.

While none of the traditional intelligence teachings are ignored - for the ANACAPA-style doctrine and other models are valuable in their ability to encourage an orderly approach to data gathering and manipulation - strategic intelligence teaching “value adds” to existing doctrine by stressing other techniques necessary to successful outcomes. Just as strategic intelligence doctrine establishes methodologies that emphasise a creative and flexible approach to collection, integration and interpretation, so does teaching strategy emphasise a high level of awareness of the various thinking, planning and interpretation skills involved in analysing and then synthesising situations to make informed predictions.

CURRENT PRACTICE AND CHALLENGES

Many enforcement agencies are increasingly tasking their intelligence staff to address strategic issues, to enable better planning for the recruitment, training, equipping and focusing of operational units. However,

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this picture is by no means a universal one and even those agencies that do undertake strategic intelligence activities are not yet necessarily fully competent in their approaches to, or execution of these tasks. It is important to examine some of the present difficulties in achieving not only acceptance of the strategic intelligence “idea,” but also in reaching better levels of expertise.

Change of the dimension discussed in this paper, aimed at encouraging senior executives and corporate management to accept advisory input to their decision-making prerogatives, is not easily achieved. While intelligence managers and staff of various agencies and governments have, by and large, begun to understand the value of strategic intelligence services in the field of law enforcement, they are *not* the change agents: corporate management is. It is to corporate management and executive levels, therefore, that the strategic intelligence “message” needs to be sold and this demands special development approaches that are so far mostly lacking.

In many, if not most, agencies the pattern of development thus far has been for training in strategic intelligence--even where it occurs-- to begin at the practitioner level, relying upon a management approval to conduct such training, usually conditional upon the expectation of future production of valuable strategic intelligence reports and assessments. Given the nature of the strategic intelligence process and the likelihood that product will take some time to produce, often well beyond the recollection of those managers involved in approving it, it is likely that this approach to development and training-- starting at the bottom-- is deficient.

What is clearly needed is client conviction at the very outset--in effect creating a market demand before supplying the product. This is absolutely fundamental if the strategic intelligence service is to be not just acceptable to management, but actively sought after. To achieve this, the scheduling of custom-designed special development and learning activities for executives is essential if the client managers are to become true believers in their need for better intelligence service. By contrast, there is little long-term benefit to be gained by managers merely accepting our statements of a better world yet to come and indulging us by approving only practitioner training. It is their needs that have to be paramount, not ours.

It is certainly possible and practicable to reach into specific client audiences, even at the highest level, given the modern propensity for managerial workshops, seminars and retreats. And it is equally possible to structure specialised content to convince these executives of not only the potential frailty of their decision-making processes, but of the liabilities that go hand-in-hand with any unstructured approach to major decision-making.

This sort of executive development training, short but persuasive, has been undertaken in several agencies but it is all too infrequently accepted so far. Yet without it, while practitioner training can proceed, the lack of executive conviction about the worth of strategic intelligence has the capacity to inhibit the process further down the line of activity. Creating client and executive commitment to strategic research and analysis as an integral component of management decision-making is fundamental to enhancing organisational effectiveness and an important challenge to the intelligence community.

The second major challenge facing the intelligence profession in this field of strategic intelligence revolves around the issue of competent practice. In those agencies which have, at some managerial level, embraced the ideals of a strategic intelligence service to executive decision-making, “strategic assessment” often assumes the dimension of being the latest fad in managerial practice. At a simplistic level, this can translate into a hunger for quick strategic intelligence assessment support to *all* major decisions, with the emphasis changing from quality to quantity, from careful consideration of all the issues to quick consideration of what is deemed to be relevant, even before thorough examination.

There is no doubt that, in some intelligence units and in some agencies, strategic intelligence has assumed the currency of becoming a popular icon. If this level of intelligence service could be offered expertly, by specialist practitioners, to considerate and careful thinkers at management levels, there would be no problem. But the observable reality is that, in common with all fads, there is an accompanying urgency to produce and possess the commodity, often at the expense of quality (however one might measure it.) Many examples of this syndrome abound and professional intelligence officers will know, from personal or close experience, of

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the pressures in the recent past to produce strategic intelligence products against self-defeating constraints. For example, it is all too frequently the case that a major topic, worthy of strategic consideration, becomes (or maybe even starts out to be) limited by unreasonable demands of time, prejudicial expectations of the likely answers, or unimaginative and arbitrary limitations of the types and sources of data to be used in the project.

The benchmark of strategic analysis is that, for every task agreed and articulated between the client and the intelligence officer, it is possible to develop a relatively “ideal” approach that covers the nature and extent of the topic, what information to gather, how to collate and evaluate it and, ultimately a range of options on how to interpret the picture (or pictures) emerging. However idealistic this might sound, there is ample room, too, for pragmatic decisions to be agreed and taken by both the client and the intelligence officer on each of these issues. What is important is that such decisions on defining and planning any project be taken in full knowledge of what *could* be achieved. It should be a matter of deep concern to present practitioners that the negotiation/agreement process, as often as not, is determined arbitrarily and without consideration of the impact of those decisions.

In the worst possible case (and there are regrettably plenty of examples), the strategic intelligence process develops no life of its own, but becomes hostage to managerial dictate that sets unreasonable limitations-- ones that ultimately mean that the client never does receive the answer that could and should have been provided. This is important in two respects. First, an assessment that leaves the client vaguely-- or positively-- disappointed impacts on the whole image of the intelligence unit within that agency. Secondly, and one that practitioners should find just as worrying, an inadequate assessment is only useful if one can learn from it; and yet it is extraordinarily difficult to see any clear evidence that the “learning from our mistakes” approach is one we willingly embrace. We, as a profession, pride ourselves on our objectivity-- yet when it comes to criticism and self-criticism, we are remarkably self-protective.

CONCLUSION

These comments are just a brief view of the comparatively “new world” of strategic research and analysis-- strategic intelligence-- as it applies to law enforcement. There is certainly room to believe that the concepts are gaining currency and acceptance at client level, albeit slowly. At the practitioner level, there still remains a degree of ignorance about the methodology and its practice, although this is easily overcome by proper training, development and leadership. The popular belief held in some circles-- that strategic intelligence is so special and different that it demands different staff and, in some strange way, threatens traditional intelligence practice-- is unsustainable. Strategic research and analysis are learned skills and all intelligence officers, once trained, should be capable of contributing to strategic intelligence activity.

The salient point we in the profession should never forget is that both tactical and strategic intelligence comfortably co-exist in the real world-- they merely illuminate different situations, for different clients, to achieve different outcomes. However, if the “good ideas” and sound concepts of strategic intelligence are to succeed, they will need the earnest, thinking involvement of the whole intelligence profession. The objectives of better management are clearly worthwhile-- and our profession needs to live up to our self-image and match those objectives with effective input and genuine commitment on our part.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT⁹

(1992)

SUMMARY

Strategic intelligence is an essential tool for the development of modern law enforcement policies, plans and programs. It is a form of intelligence applicable at all management levels: whether it assists in the deployment and use of resources by helping managers understand the complex matrix of competing public order requirements; or provides analytical support at corporate and governments levels to aid in overall justice policy planning. This paper was developed as the basis for a speech to the combined conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts in Detroit, U.S.A., in October 1992.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, there has been a noticeable upsurge in the application of intelligence services within various civilian fields: law enforcement, policy planning areas of government, criminology and other academic study centres, and in industry. Many would assert that the reasons are linked to increasing pressure within the community for “better” planning in the public sector, coupled with high expectations of accountability in the public and private arenas.

Whatever the truth of this, while this present focus on intelligence is anew and (to the profession) welcome development, we should remember that there is in fact nothing really “new” about the practice of intelligence. Indeed, it has been with us for many centuries in many different guises, serving a variety of military, political and social objectives.

During war and peace alike, in seeking to understand and interpret the action of others - and to be honest, to gain advantage from such understanding - nations, organisations and individual have historically used intelligence to provide or enhance their awareness of issues, to seize opportunities and to prepare for the future.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

The focus of the paper, however, is on the field of intelligence in law enforcement and the issues raised here will be discussed in the broad context of policing, justice administration and the maintenance of public order.

A suitable starting point will be my conviction that, in enforcement, there has been a long-held “popular” belief that the predominant role for intelligence has been to support tactical and operational objectives. This does not sit well with the lessons of history, in which intelligence has consistently reached well beyond the confines of operational activity. In fact, from the Bible onwards, the record of human endeavour is repeatedly marked with significant shifts in power that could not have taken place without the support of an intelligence capacity to look over the horizons of tactical concern, and focus instead on vision, strategies and plans for the future.

Views are changing and “strategic intelligence” is now becoming increasingly accepted within the enforcement community as a desirable, even essential, extension of traditional intelligence support.

⁹ Don McDowell. *Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers. Journal, vol. 1 no. 1*, pp.9-20, December 1992, Canberra, Australia.

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So, what is it and why have there been delays? The most likely explanation is that “intelligence” has been seen as a tactical tool, while “planning” has long been viewed as some special and distant prerogative of managers and staff generally excluding intelligence groups. Rightly or wrongly, intelligence has been too useful to operational concerns to be able to have its mandate extended into other areas of activity and service. Indeed, if applied to law enforcement interests, it is hard to imagine any persuasive argument that could deny such a valuable “future tool” to organisational executives and managers holding responsibility for developing (and reviewing) enforcement policies, plans, strategies and programs.

As a way of de-mystifying the aura that, in some areas, surrounds strategic intelligence it can be thought of simply as *an application of intelligence practice that is used specifically to examine and illuminate classes of threat, risk or opportunity.*

One of the principal myths that surround strategic intelligence is that the product belongs only to “top management”, a view derived from memories of its place in wartime as the upper echelon, “headquarters” form of intelligence. From our enforcement perspective, to hold to this view clearly ignores the realistic requirements of the typical district or regional commander; just as legitimately as others above him, this officer needs a comprehensive plan to formulate the way in which his different resources can be applied to changing crime needs in his own area.

The value of strategic intelligence, in this example is that it is able to go well beyond what tactical intelligence can see, simply by standing back and taking a longer and broader snapshot of what is, what has been, and - by so doing - forecast what might be. This form of intelligence activity, of course, is deliberate in ensuring that there can be a planned approach, well ahead of time, to resource deployment, equipment changes, development or adaptation of different skills and techniques, and variation of regulatory and compliance mechanisms.

At its best, strategic intelligence can be a truly pro-active form of intelligence activity working directly in support of management planning, regardless of the level of “management” one sees as the client. In this way, strategic intelligence is not “competing” with tactical intelligence: rather, it complements it, but at different levels within organisations.

In any typical law enforcement agency, therefore, the development of strategic studies that are specific to agency interests is obviously a legitimate pursuit for intelligence in that agency. It would be unthinkable - even irresponsible - for any agency to ignore the need to develop an awareness and understanding of enforcement issues, examining them for their impact on that agency, so that corporate plans can be developed appropriately.

However, this form of agency-relevant planning can not, logically, occur in a conceptual vacuum. While the practice has often been for agencies to investigate and analyse issues within their own organisational boundaries, looking solely at “policing issues” and “police data”, there are considerable dangers in adopting any approach that leaves out consideration of other views, aspects, and features of the area of crime study.

It is perhaps understandable that, in times of resource limitations, enforcement agencies have to be seen to concentrate only on the issues at hand, but this cannot be taken to an extreme where important matters outside of traditional policing areas are ignored in the name of expedience or apparent irrelevance. To do so almost certainly means a shortfall in the quality of outcomes, plans and programs. In fact, it is obvious that law enforcement, justice and public order concerns do not and can not operate in a vacuum. At the single agency level, the same could be said of agency aims and objectives: it is hardly possible for any police force or similar group to argue that its role is independent of other concerns, for there are always points of contact (and the potential for tension) between the agency and the community, let alone between agencies themselves. Inevitably, enforcement concerns interact with a wide range of social policies and community interests. If planning has to take account of these expanded dimensions - so, too, must the practice of strategic intelligence.

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To be effective, strategic intelligence activity within enforcement agencies must therefore be allowed - even encouraged - to consider issues on a broad plane examining all relevant aspects of the crime problem, if it is to provide an appropriate and useful level of service.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The need for strategic intelligence support for planning activities can also logically be taken even further than just providing a service for individual enforcement groups. While it is possible for a single enforcement agency, acting independently of others, to develop a strategic view of the issues on which it is - or should be - focusing, the reality is that it is increasingly becoming more and more difficult to conceive of issues which exist only within the law enforcement sphere of interest.

At the top levels of government community service and social planning, any reasonable and open-minded study of strategic policing and justice issues will inevitably have to consider a broad range of matters beyond merely the obvious police issues.

When one seeks to understand any significant issue of criminality, real or potential, it is essential that we accept the need to consider not only those aspects that relate strictly to the crime as committed (using typical police information sources), but that we also search for an understanding of such aspects as facilitation and motivation (and others of this ilk) that impact on and explain the issue under examination.

Without this broader, more comprehensive approach to analysis, it is unlikely that justice policies will be able to be developed to effectively provide the essential matrix covering all the legitimate concerns and responsibilities of the stakeholders. In fact, unless we are prepared to develop such a holistic approach to viewing crime in its total setting, the policies and programs of agencies and governments will inevitably be designed and executed in a piecemeal fashion.

Numerous examples can be given of the unstructured development of enforcement policies and programs that unfortunately ignore the necessary interaction with other stakeholder interests. Conversely, there are useful examples that can be given of attempts to undertake a serious, structured and disciplined approach to develop strategic overviews of the criminal environment from a "total" perspective. Clearly this second approach is the one that ought to be adopted by governments at all levels, recognising strategic analysis for the powerful tool that is.

Clearly, such subjects as illegal drugs, immigration, fraud, domestic (or gang) violence and corruption, are all obvious examples of a genre in which there is a demonstrable need to take a broader view of all the issues likely to be involved. In such cases, strategic intelligence must be given the opportunities to probe beyond what is simply of interest to enforcement organisations, and examine the wider arena of issues and aspects that are both relevant and necessary to any comprehensive understanding of what makes these crimes occur, how they operate, who they involve, and what is their impact. Without this breadth of understanding, how could organisations and governments hope to establish sensible, workable counter-programs?

IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

Accepting that strategic intelligence activity already occurs in some few organisations, its enhancement (or introduction, where necessary) needs an organisational commitment to strategic thinking, coupled with a methodical approach to strategic intelligence study and analysis. Within the law enforcement community, implementation of strategic intelligence raises two principal questions:

- (a) selling the concepts and the "need" to executive management levels; and
- (b) putting in place the resources and mechanisms to carry out the functions.

1. Convincing Management

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Decision-making is never difficult of itself; it is, however, very hard to do with any semblance of getting the process - and the outcomes - “right”. The law enforcement community does not lack any availability of dynamic decision-makers. The calling of professional policing often demands quick response to perceived situations, a matter of understandable pride to its members. But forward planning, in whatever field, demands something more than quick, conditioned response and requires a great deal of care and thought about the objectives and the processes involved.

If the enforcement community is to meet and best the challenges of both the present and the future, it is essential that management executives be given the opportunity to see and understand the need for a more useful approach to strategic thinking and analysis. As a matter of course, most enforcement agencies have for some time involved their senior officers in strategic management training and development of corporate plans and programs.

Regrettably, what remains lacking, for the most part, is any substantial emphasis on strategic analysis as the key component that links “thinking” and “planning”. To counter this, managers and executives need special exposure to the sort of training and development and familiarisation opportunities that will convince them of the logic of investing effort in the structured analysis of strategic issues. At the same time, they will need to be given direction and encouragement to understand the requirements - and the obligations - they will face in tasking, guiding, managing and utilising the strategic intelligence service and its products.

2. Settling the Resources and Management Issues

It is equally important to provide specialised training and development programs for strategic intelligence practitioners at all levels. In simple terms, such programs would be aimed at applying existing or known intelligence skills and techniques in such a way as to suit the special requirements of strategic intelligence.

The reality is that strategic intelligence activity is, if anything, even more structured and disciplined than we are used to undertaking in serving tactical or operational needs. The reason is not complicated: strategic intelligence calls for examination of issues and application of intelligence practice across a wider canvas, with more imponderables and the application of greater levels of knowledge, specialisation and judgement.

To meet these challenges, to commit managers and clients to realistic expectations and obligations concerning resources, all involve a substantial emphasis on what might be called front-end engineering of the strategic intelligence project. This is properly the joint responsibility of practitioners, clients and managers alike, but it is certain that no strategic intelligence project can proceed without the investment of considerable planning first.

Given the long and historical association of intelligence proactive with the development of plans (predominantly in the defence and international relations areas), it is surprising that its application to the arena of law enforcement is a relatively recent occurrence. Whatever the reason for this delay, there has now been substantial development in the drafting of doctrine covering strategic intelligence methodology and in the establishment of appropriate training programs.

Both the doctrine and the training emphasise the care and thought essential in the planning and process of strategic intelligence activity. Perhaps it is of more interest to note that the aim, throughout, is to empower intelligence officers to accept that the breadth of the strategic study will, inevitably, lead to less precision in forecasts and greater reliance on personal knowledge, expertise and judgement of the issues at hand.

This approach is somewhat at odds with developed tactical intelligence practice and traditional intelligence training, in which intelligence, investigation, evidence and prosecution are inter-mingled. Nonetheless, it is a key feature of strategic intelligence that the analysis and conclusions have to be accepted for what they are - imprecise, best guesses and expert opinions of what remains, until some future date, inconclusive data and impressions. Yet without even this level of education, structured and disciplined “crystal ball gazing”, proper planning simply is not possible.

THE CURRENT CHALLENGE

In the foregoing comments I have dealt with some of the basic issues surrounding the introduction and development of strategic intelligence for law enforcement. In the following brief comments I want to outline some of the major issues that face us, highlighting the dilemmas that many enforcement agencies currently face.

Clearly the introduction and overlaying of another form of intelligence activity in any agency presents, in some cases, problems associated with the conflict of priorities for scarce resources. This relates to yet another myth that surrounds strategic intelligence in that it is resource-hungry; yet this does not truly reflect the real situation. Wherever intelligence units are established and information-collection mechanisms operate, the addition of a strategic intelligence role adds little real cost burden to existing operations beyond the additional staff members needed.

Given the nature of strategic intelligence and the long term investment of study and involvement of particular topics (which would themselves be the priorities set by each agency), even the human resource implications can be minimal compared with the operational and tactical intelligence environment.

Where strategic intelligence really is “hungry” is in its thirst for information that includes (but is by no means limited to) all that data normally collected by traditional intelligence units. Strategic intelligence will always need to look beyond and outside of the agency perimeter, tapping into a wide variety of sources, most of them free of charge (libraries, other government departments or enforcement groups, and academic study centres, for example).

Two final notes about challenge are important. Firstly, although it may be a somewhat bizarre reflection of the realities of the enforcement community, one cannot escape observing that as intelligence “power” increases in concert with the high visibility of strategic intelligence activity, so too does the propensity for competition between different agencies and power groups, an environment that can lead to tension, instead of one showing genuine cooperation. Changing this all-too-common pattern will be no mean feat.

Secondly, in a climate of continuing “rationalist” management, there are increasing demands from political and audit interest that law enforcement conform with performance measurement mechanisms unsuited to their peculiar needs. Intelligence activity is not excluded from this, and yet little real work has been done on conceptualising performance measurement mechanisms that are relevant and appropriate the nature of intelligence work. Clearly this is a priority if we are to properly gauge the efficacy of strategic (and other) intelligence work. Unless some appropriate regiment developed, intelligence will continue to be saddled with expectations that all intelligence leads directly to arrest - with the predictable consequences if we are unable to show such a nexus exists.

CONCLUSION

From a practitioner’s standpoint the development, adaptation and introduction of strategic intelligence into the law enforcement environment, is the most exciting development of recent years. Realistically, the battle between increasing crime and diminishing enforcement resources creates, as one unfortunate outcome, a feeling of frustration that overtakes any but the most cursory review of what exists and threatens in the “now.” There is just not enough time or mental energy to sit back and think through issues at a macro level.

It is, therefore, natural for individuals and agencies to focus on their own specific areas of interest and responsibility, and to strive for efficiency in that arena. What is missing, however understandably, is the realisation that no agency “owns” a discrete area of responsibility free from concerns about or impact implication on other areas.

For many years coordination, communication and cooperation concepts have been the mainstay of managements that seek to minimise the interface difficulties between areas of responsibility. While this package of approaches remains vital, a greater commitment to active, fulsome evaluation and exploration of

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issues is paramount . . . if the community is to get the protection it deserves and, indeed, imagines it already receives.

Certainly there are challenges and probably trying times ahead, but one thing is certain: now that the enforcement community understand the need for better, more informed analysis and planning, strategic intelligence is a fixed feature on the agenda.

ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT STYLE
“THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN VISION AND DECISIONS”
(1992)

SUMMARY

This is a paper about management: its role in determining and deciding issues, and the need for clever forward thinking and planning to bring about “successful” and “effective” management. It is also a paper that raises the issue of why strategic analysis, as part of planning, does not always sit happily with the corporate environment. I have couched my arguments and observations in a public sector setting but these matters are just as relevant for industry and commerce; anywhere, in fact, that important decisions need to be made efficiently and effectively. The paper was originally presented as a speech (and appears here in the same format) at the INTEL'92 Conference in Sydney, Australia, in December 1992.¹⁰

INTRODUCTION

I have chosen to deal with this topic from the apparently limited perspective of analysis and its role in any management environment. Limited, perhaps, but as these comments unfold we will see that, without analysis, management science might become only a collection of arty acts of guesswork. A useful start point is for us to explore, in general terms, some of the common issues about intelligence and its utilisation.

INTELLIGENCE AS A SERVANT

As intelligence practitioners, it must seem obvious to us all that real intelligence serves a variety of masters. Intelligence is indeed a service: it is not a self-serving entity in its own right. It should not, in the best of worlds, have any self-sustaining life of its own and, as such, it can never serve its own interests for no such interests legitimately exist. And yet many of us would, in fact, be able to observe from personal experience that this dictum seems often to be breached. So what is the reality of intelligence and what is it actually meant to be ?

From a conceptual point of view, intelligence as a practice exists to illuminate the obscure; to forecast what is yet to come; to explain the “iceberg” of truth beneath the “tip” of what can be seen. The uses to which this craft can be put are unbounded: history is replete with examples of famous and infamous actions that have taken place as the direct (and sometimes indirect) result of the views arrived at through an intelligence-based understanding of people’s motives, intentions and capacity. The fortunes and misfortunes of peoples, races, cultures and empires has often turned on what, in retrospect, can be seen now to have been either “good” or “bad” intelligence.

We should be prepared to admit, then, that any pretensions one might have about what might be called the “purity” of purpose of intelligence are hardly borne out by historical (or even current) fact. Intelligence is a weapon: it is a tool just like any other. It can be used for good, or not-so-good, or even downright evil purposes. It can be used competently or with little apparent skill. It can be applied to worthy causes, just as it can be under-utilised and even wasted.

The essential truth about intelligence, whether one uses it as a weapon or as a tool . . . is that it remains “neutral” in a sense. It exists to be used and the values we might place on the efficiency, the purpose and the

¹⁰ (Don McDowell. Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers. Journal, vol. 2 no. 3, pp.13-22, September 1993, Canberra, Australia.)

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outcomes of its use are, in fact, those values imparted by the user - they are not intrinsic to the intelligence product itself.

It is “people” who desire the service of intelligence. People operate the processes and people determine the outcomes. Finally, these same people act on the product, interpreting it in the context of their priorities and agendas. So when we observe that “intelligence often seems to serve its own ends,” we mean not the practice or the craft or the underlying philosophy of intelligence, but merely those people who are involved in conducting, acting upon or manipulating intelligence.

MANAGEMENT

Let us return to the opening theme of this paper, management and its relationship with intelligence and analysis. In the popular sense, “management” is a catch-all term that we all use nowadays to denote and describe the process of visualising, planning and leading an enterprise or activity. The nexus between the management idea and role, and the function of intelligence, is that there will always exist in organisations an identifiable body or group to which we, in intelligence, provide our service. This is a group we might refer to commonly as the “client,” but equally may think of it as “consumers” or “customers” of the intelligence service. Whatever the term we choose to use, this client represents to us that body of people in organisational positions of power, who would logically be the ultimate users of the intelligence output.

Depending upon one’s affiliation, the notion of “client” might encompass a sovereign, a government or political grouping within government. The client (he, she or they) might be a leadership group within industry or the civil service; or it might as easily be the planners and leaders of some criminal activity. The important feature is that those who have responsibility for determining the direction and making decisions of organisations are, inevitably and logically, those who are the consumers of an intelligence service.

It might help to further this discussion, to look at management in such a way as to allow us to examine some of the features, mores and values of various historical management models. My purpose in this is to see how differing management approaches might impact upon the role and functioning of analysis services within organisations. The sweeping statements of generalisation that follows are, of course, founded in fact, although I recognise that exceptions to these sometimes harsh or provocative observations also existed as good sense and patience evidenced itself among the ranks of managers. The aim, in this part of the paper, is merely to highlight some of the standards so that we might examine historical difficulties against a setting of present practice and experience.

Some, perhaps many of us, will have first-hand knowledge of management practice throughout the middle part of this century, in which management could best be described as “patriarchal.” The key features of this approach revolved around a style that was absolutist in upholding managers’ power over the individual; in all things, the person was subordinated to the organisation. Though always cited as being for one’s good, the fact is that patriarchal styles of management inevitably meant that one group of involved persons “gained” in terms of power and influence, and other larger groups lost their capacity for input and involvement except in pursuit of loyalty and only under close direction. This is not to say that this patriarchal style was, however, always necessarily bad. Clearly it suited those for whom following was better than leading, and a strong perception of paternalistic goodwill went a lot of the way towards minimising any latent dissatisfaction. Indeed, the style was, itself, evidence of the continuing “old order” of natural division of classes of worker and had been congruent with general social patterns up to the middle part of this century.

So what effect did the patriarchal style of management have on the issue we are discussing here? Was decision-making dependent upon the sort of analytical input that we know intelligence could provide?

This management culture, once operating, tended to be self-perpetuating in that it generated an institutionalised acceptance of rather submissive “order taking” among the work force. Power groups exercised control over all aspects of the working (and sometimes the social) life of others. In this climate, whole generations of workers generally came to tend towards conformist behaviour, trusting their futures and careers to others, providing obedience and loyal support to a nurturing management structure. At the same

time, this supportive workforce was actively prevented, more by circumstances than by order, from playing to its full potential in providing intellectual, innovative and imaginative input to work processes.

Management power, exercised in this way consistently without input or feedback, tended to view decision-making as necessarily operating as the sole right of those in management positions. Such a practice was often devoid of balanced input and became one in which strength of will and determination to succeed were more valued than any other features of managerial activity.

This sort of approach bred confidence to a level that often, and rather unfortunately so, outstripped reality. Managers who operated alone, perhaps with the best of intentions, came progressively to believe in the value of their own experience and training and, hence, judgement. The solitude of life at the top of an organisational unit, and the lack of other sources of qualitative input, created a strong potential for “closed loop” management. This fed upon itself with little expectation of the availability of other advice, nor any inclination to seek it.

In these circumstances, “analysis” and “research” had little chance of competing successfully for attention. Perhaps a rule of thumb might have articulated thus: if managers have to operate under stress and without substantial availability of real support and advice, then those managers will, in time, come to believe that they do not need any such support or advice. We all know that management styles have changed dramatically over the past two or three decades: changes in management and industrial relations that allegedly mirror changed societal beliefs about the value and rights of the individual.

The “new wave management” theories of the 1970s and 80s emphasised, publicly, a dramatic opening for worker participation in planning and decision-making. This move evolved as a strategy to satisfy the principal goal of harnessing goodwill and talent from the workforce, within a contributive framework. The concept of participative management, with its attendant workforce involvement (or at least the expectation of having it) in all matters affecting the future of workers, was a significant extension beyond the historical involvement of unions and workplace representatives. In the past, such involvement was in matters more likely to relate to safety and conditions of employment than the business future of an enterprise.

The rhetoric of this shift in management style engendered worker expectations of a life in which business decision-making would become an exercise in genuine participation, and the quality of decisions and management plans would thus be better for all concerned. No more the decisions of patriarchs and absolutists governed by the “this is for your own good” syndrome !

THE PRESENT

In the event, modern management practice is, in some respects, little different from older styles. One might well ask how this can be, if the governing theories are so different?

I suspect that the answer lies not in any subterfuge about the theories themselves, but in the particular stresses and strains that modern living and economic conditions impose upon organisational behaviour. Indeed, one should not be surprised at this; we only have to look at the Difference between industrial theory and practice of the industrial revolution to understand just how persuasive was Robbie Burns’ observation about “best laid plans...”.

In fact, modern management practice (as opposed to theory) is, in many ways, just as patriarchal as its predecessor, at least in terms of the “power syndrome” though not in the context of familial concern for the work force. What has evolved in these recent decades has been, it is true, a participative approach to management practice that has set in place industrial mechanisms to guarantee the involvement of all levels of staff in discussing issues that face managers. I use the term “involvement” because there are no guarantees that opinions are heeded, nor that staff needs will be met’ merely that each voice may be heard even though not necessarily considered. The form is present’ the substance may well be lacking.

The reasons are obvious. Competitive pressure, even in the public sector, to perform to standards set by others has taken its toll of the implementation of what began as sound management vision. As senior

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executives and managers at all levels are placed on notice that performance is paramount, then it is no wonder that all aspects of management practice are examined against notional standards of what “good performance” might look like. In far too many organisations the criteria for judgement have slipped from a basis of quality towards quantifiable measures.

In such a climate, decision-making is seen as a process that can be evaluated: was it quick, were all the right moves taken, were the right people informed about outcomes and impact, was no-one else’s decision making adversely affected or delayed? Questions of this ilk quickly become questions about lists, checks and balances, with ticks in the box, due-by dates and backlog figures being attractive measures.

The hidden outcome in such circumstances is that there has been little to distinguish how so-called modern managers exercise their responsibilities in any way better than the historical models. Decision-making becomes subject to the pressures of time and decisiveness (the need to appear to be “dynamic”), with quality an issue of third place. I do not for a moment assert that wrong decisions are rewarded; rather, dynamic decision-making creates an image of success, enthusiasm and vibrance that ambitious managers (and “survivors”) value highly.

Not only are there pressures of this sort – the tension between quality and quantity, or process and outcome – but one should consider the added impact of stress arising from rationalisation moves, restriction, constraint and increasing competition, not only between organisations but within them. This total picture of pressure creates an environment in which conforming to standards of urgency and dynamism (set by upper level corporate executives) are valued above other, more qualitative, measures. In essence, my observation is that while managerial theory may have changed, there remains little evidence of managers yet committed to “thinking smarter”, rather than continuing to work even harder! Yet, at the same time, management training has become an object of particular focus, with heavy emphasis on concepts such as strategic thinking and planning, the development of visions and corporate plans. While it is clearly important to many that their organisations follow the rhetoric of clever responsive and forward-looking management concepts, there is too little in practice that translates this into real commitment to careful and structured thinking.

Managers remain, to an unhappy degree, intellectually isolated from those able to support them, victims of corporate urgency to “act”. The pivotal and positive argument here is that all of this pressure actually creates a tense and busy management environment in which the sensible answer would include recognition of the essentiality of analysis and research in decision-making, rather than taking it to be a bothersome activity that doesn’t actually serve the needs of busy, dynamic executives. Clearly there is a role for responsive and reactive carriage of many business activities, in government or elsewhere; careful thought and impact analysis is, however, what is needed in the realm of forward planning. To do otherwise is a ludicrous proposition.

If one accepts the foregoing as an explanation of how things currently work, what is it that we need to do differently? To return to the theme of this paper, clearly there exists a package of “tools” to assist managers in their work, among these being the availability of analytical research and interpretational skills and methodologies. One should neither misunderstand nor trivialise this: apart from luck, good decisions are driven by careful consideration.

To put this fairly into context we should also remember that current theories clearly identify “analysis” as an essential step between the thinking (visioning) phase and the plan development phase of managerial activity. What seems to have happened, though, is that the analysis step is generally truncated and glossed over, both in terms of time and quality, and indeed little is ever actually taught about this part of the process of management practice.

The analysis process (and this includes the planned collection, research and interpretation of information) is relatively simple to establish in any organisation. It is not hugely costly or resource-expensive to run, nor does it need an inordinate amount of time to complete projects to provide input to management. All these are, after all, issues of application and implementation and do not constitute a logical barrier to putting the analysis system in place whatever the organisation.

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What is at issue is not “how” or “where” or “when” to introduce the analysis links into the management chain. The challenge for many, now, is simply “why not?”

The answer is both simple and obvious. The development of major policies and programs, the determination of operational priorities and plans, all demand and indeed deserve our best efforts. It is true that there are pressures that can lead to the sacrifice of detailed consideration of issues in the name of urgency and expediency. Yet these self-same pressures are the very ones that we should accept as being the mandate for acting not only decisively, but cleverly; acting to maximise our potential and thus, at the same time, avoiding “average” as a level of attainment.

Were we to accept this approach – the need for inserting good analysis into the decision-making routines - then what are the implications for management, and how should we deal with them? There are several obligations in following such a course of action.

Firstly, all the participants would have to structure opportunities for pause and careful consideration of key issues. This would permit the widest possible examination of all the relevant features of a problem (or opportunity). This would have to be done in a way consistent with time-critical requirements, but not truncated or otherwise put at risk by tradition or form or bias or any other imposed behavioural limitation.

Secondly, there would be a need for executives to commit themselves to working with analysts and researchers to clarify the issues and priorities involved; to sketch in the framework of the context in which the ultimate decisions will have to be taken; to provide active and real support and a mandate for the analysis and research process to take place effectively; and to empower those involved, giving them clear authority and an expectation that their assessments, answers and recommendations must be as objective as can be achieved, and certainly free from organisational prejudice.

There are, of course, further implications that relate to the responsibilities of managers once they have the results and advice from the analysis and research effort and input. First and foremost is the challenge for management to consider fairly the “neutral” assessment of issues (free of any flavour of conformism or self-interest). This is a challenge that is not always easy to meet, since managers themselves can be expected to already hold views on these same issues. While the analysts and researchers have to maintain their objectivity as best they can, this same challenge has to be met by the decision-makers in weighing up the advice and reaching decisions on outcomes and priorities.

On a more positive note, one pleasing outcome will be the enhancement to staff morale and self worth that derives from becoming meaningfully involved in shaping the organisation’s direction. This will have the additional benefit of tending to improve the overall quality of advice as experience grows but, more particularly, as they are seen to be trusted in their assisting and advising roles.

There are, on the other hand, some inhibitors to putting in place this sort of commitment to analytical advice. Firstly, the present trend for isolationist and conformist approach to management style and operation, often seeking only advice that supports views that are already safely held, can lead to a continuing sense of complacency about how well management is currently performing. It is all too easy to accept that power, the mantle of responsibility and intense levels of activity are synonymous with infallibility. Yet one would wonder: if there is that high a degree of frenetic involvement in just getting on with managing, where does the time, skill and energy come from that will allow the manager to gather, sift and analyse the information necessary to make such clever decisions? Ego and self-reliance are part of the emotional and intellectual conflict between dynamism, conformity and survival (on the one hand), and acceptance of one’s needs (and recognition of imperfection) on the other.

Lastly, in this discussion on implications, there is the question of costs of establishing and operating an effective analytical and research apparatus within an organisation. The good news is that there exists both a relevant body of knowledge and the availability of skills; indeed, the skills and techniques can be learned relatively easily. Human resources are relatively inexpensive, and analysts with varying types and degrees of experience are available, needing principally encouragement to utilise their talents, enthusiasm and cleverness. A prime cost is, of course, the need for management levels to meet the challenge of mandating the

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analytical function and encouraging it to operate effectively. This is easier said than done, for it requires corporate executives to accept that they cannot function alone in decision-making. For those managers and organisations that either do not have or use the analytical support activity suggested here (or use it only sparingly or prejudicially), there is the challenge of showing courage in choosing to think fully and carefully about issues; courage in being seen to pause when the organisational environment seems to call for dynamic action.

Not only are these pressures existent, but there are those organisational and cultural features which often perpetuate and institutionalise thought processes and idea generation to “fit in” with current belief systems. This is the stuff of “safe” management in the sense of being in tune with established peer practice. Yet what could be better than doing well, using all the tools at hand, rather than mirroring what one thinks are the acceptable ideas and practice?

Management is essentially easy – if one knows both “the ropes” (operational practice routines) and the options (ideas and possibilities tied to organisational futures).

Strategic analysis is, at its very best, a strong and dynamic “options tool”.

Why continue to ignore it?

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE : DEFINING THE NATIONAL THREAT TO PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY

(1991)

AN APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL CAPACITY FOR
PRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ON THE CRIMINAL ENVIRONMENT
(AN AUSTRALIAN MODEL)

SUMMARY

In little over a decade since the late 1970s, Australian law enforcement organisations¹¹ have individually embraced the need for establishment of intelligence units to support their operational activities. In recognition of the need for intelligence sharing, all State, Territory and Commonwealth law enforcement agencies have participated in the establishment of a central intelligence bureau (ABCI) to consolidate crime information and co-ordinate intelligence studies into special interest areas.

Understandably, given the wide variation in the size, nature and direction of intelligence apparatuses established within each jurisdiction, almost all of the agencies have concentrated on generating intelligence support that is directly applicable to each agency's tactical situations and priorities. The few exceptions to this practice have been Commonwealth agencies (the AFP, NCA, Customs) and, more latterly, the ABCI. The very nature of the areas of responsibility of these particular agencies has demanded that they give urgent attention to looking beyond the development of purely tactical intelligence and provide an additional service that requires them to look further into the future and describe the nature of threat posed to their jurisdictional interests.

Against this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it describes in some detail the justification and apparatus for the production of strategic intelligence by the various agency members of the law enforcement community. Secondly, it outlines key concepts for the further development and use of strategic intelligence within the law enforcement environment in Australia.

The following terms and acronyms are used throughout this paper:

ABCI	<i>Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence</i>
ACS	<i>Australian Customs Service</i>
AFP	<i>Australian Federal Police</i>
CIA	<i>Central Intelligence Agency (United States)</i>
CJC	<i>Criminal Justice Commission (Queensland)</i>
Customs	<i>Australian Customs Service</i>
CTRA	<i>Cash Transaction Reports Agency</i>
DIO	<i>Defence Intelligence Organisation</i>
NCA	<i>National Crime Authority</i>
NPRU	<i>National Police Research Unit</i>

¹¹ The term is used in this paper to include: State and Territory Police Forces; the AFP [Australian Federal Police]; the NCA [National Crime Authority]; the ABCI [Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence]; Customs [the Australian Customs Service] and others [e.g. Immigration] where indicated.

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first, some basic ideas about intelligence and its role generally in a law enforcement environment are discussed, with specific emphasis on strategic intelligence. The focus in this part, as indicated above, is essentially directed towards describing the provision of intelligence services within individual agencies and, in doing so, covers the following areas:

- the rationale for production of intelligence
- definitional statements on types of intelligence
- users and their application of intelligence products
- resources required to produce intelligence
- management of the intelligence process

While it can be assumed that many readers of this paper will already have some familiarity with "the Craft of Intelligence"¹², the detailed approach in Part 1 of this paper, particularly, is intended to provide an informed discussion of the rationale for (and workings of) the strategic intelligence arena within law enforcement as a common basis of understanding for the discussion in Part 2.

Part 2 of the paper moves away from this discussion of agency-specific arrangements. In accepting the efficacy and legitimacy of law enforcement agencies carrying out their own intelligence support programs, including the generating of corporately-supportive strategic intelligence, this part examines, instead, the argument for generating a centrally co-ordinated strategic intelligence service - one that could provide an overall focus on law enforcement for the Commonwealth Government - to enable the development of national, rather than agency-based, law enforcement policies and strategies.

¹² In describing the discipline of intelligence, this title was coined by Allen Dulles, former head of CIA, in his book of the same name.

PART 1 : CONCEPTS, APPLICATION AND MANAGEMENT

RATIONALE, DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

1. Organisational Decision-Making

The basic premise in any discussion of intelligence is that, regardless of how it may be defined, it is an essential component activity of every rational decision-making process. In the context of this paper, a useful start point in understanding intelligence is to examine the relationship between the identification of organisational needs and the decision-making process to meet those needs.

In simple terms, any organisation's decision-making falls into two principal dimensions:

1. decisions concerning overall direction and purpose of the organisation
2. decisions affecting implementation of these "direction statements" of the organisation

This concept holds as true for law enforcement bodies as it does for any other form of organisation, whether they be military, industrial or public sector agencies. To determine agency goals, to decide what objectives the organisation ought best to develop, to decide upon operational routines and priorities - these are all steps essential to the establishment of the working "rules" for the organisation.

To do this effectively demands a high degree of knowledge and awareness of the environment within which the organisation is to work. Information is the key to this process and, yet, information by itself is not necessarily enough to ensure that decision-making is a wholly rational and logical activity. What is really needed is a set of forward-looking perspectives of those events, activities and trends that are likely to affect the organisation's achievement of its goals in short, **intelligence**.

Whatever the organisation's field of endeavour, **all** intelligence is concerned with determining the following parameters in respect of an identified target group (however broadly the target may be defined and described):

Capabilities

Intentions

Limitations

Vulnerabilities

It is important to understand that the term "intelligence" can be used to describe both the process (of converting raw information into something more useful) and the final product of that process. Indeed, most definitions of intelligence describe it in terms encompassing both dimensions, along the lines of the following:

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information concerning one or more areas of operation, a product which is immediately (or potentially) significant for planning purposes.

Information is essential to the intelligence process. Intelligence, on the other hand, is not simply an amalgam of collected information. It is, instead, the result of taking information relevant to a specific issue and subjecting it to a process of integration, evaluation and analysis with the specific purpose of projecting future events and actions, and estimating and predicting outcomes.

2. Strategic Intelligence

Just as decision-making operates in the two main dimensions discussed above, the total intelligence effort operating in support of any organisation is most effective if it addresses these two separate (but necessarily linked) levels of interest and focus. At one end of the scale, implementation of an organisation's operational responsibilities is clearly the role assigned to line units. At the other extreme, corporate executives have the prime responsibility for development of the organisational guidelines and direction statements that chart the overall direction of the organisation. In the necessary process of developing and reviewing policies and strategies, the provision of up-to-date knowledge and forecasts of future trends is not just important, it is key to the success of the development/review process. This essential support service is a particular sort of intelligence, termed strategic intelligence. While it acts in direct support of the policy-making function, it does *not* usurp that responsibility from the organisation's decision-makers.

Two useful **definitions of strategic intelligence**, as it is appropriate to the law enforcement environment, are as follows:

Strategic intelligence provides the law enforcement organisation with an overview of criminal capabilities, vulnerabilities, trends and intentions in order to allow for the formulation of organisational policies and plans to combat criminal activity.

In the fields of enforcement and compliance, strategic intelligence and analysis focuses on comprehensively describing and assessing a phenomenon, its history and likely future changes, in order to allow the review and development of policies, programs, legislation and strategic direction.

It is important to note that there are many different forms of this definition in existence since many agencies feel a need to produce a modified version to suit their organisation's particular circumstances. All the variations, however, include the common notions of width of overview and the intention to feed into macro-planning activities.

Since much of the practice of law enforcement intelligence owes its genesis to the military intelligence model, it is appropriate to note here the comparable military definition of strategic intelligence:

Strategic Intelligence is that intelligence required for the formation of national defence policy and military plans at both the national and international levels.

It is relatively easy for a well set up and sourced intelligence unit to provide comment on the "real story" behind current events as well as noting emerging developments in previously established patterns of activity. These sorts of intelligence product are variously described as basic (or background) intelligence and current intelligence. Since both are clearly removed from the immediacy of tactical, line-support intelligence, this type of intelligence effort becomes part of the strategic intelligence activity. However, it must be remembered that the intelligence product becomes severely limited *unless* it can also comment upon the impact of the likely medium-to-long term outcomes of these developments.

In short, intelligence must be able to offer advice to answer the "so what?" questions likely to be posed by the agency. To do this, the Intelligence unit must be prepared to look beyond the immediate period for interpretation of the picture in terms of its future impact. By so doing, corporate executives will be able to review plans and policies that define the organisation's approach to issues of purpose, direction, resource and materiel management. One particularly apposite term for this value-added dimension of strategic intelligence product, coined by the military, is *indicators and warning intelligence*.

3. Tactical Intelligence

Beyond the type of intelligence support described above that is needed for input to the development and review of corporate strategies and policies, there also exists a clear need to provide intelligence that will aid the

organisation in implementing its operational tasks. Law enforcement (and military) bodies commonly use two terms to describe this sort of close-support intelligence: operational intelligence or tactical intelligence. It is possible to draw some distinction between the two based, for example, on issues like the level of threat identified, the size of organisational unit likely to be involved in reacting to the product, or the immediacy of the target or threat identified. However, present practice in law enforcement agencies is to simply see this type of intelligence as generically serving line functions and supporting operational activity, terming it tactical intelligence. The standard definition shown below may nonetheless, as before, appear in various forms, although *all* carry the common denominators of service and support to line activity.

Tactical Intelligence is aimed at directly meeting enforcement objectives, by focusing on criminal organisations, individuals and modus operandi, and is targeted at specific criminal activity with the goal of neutralising that activity.

4. Development and Application of Strategic Intelligence

Every organisation has its legitimacy of purpose based on a statement of its established role and function. Law enforcement organisations (and others in the public sector) rely on government legislative prescriptions for their focus, e.g. Administrative Arrangements Orders. In moving to accomplish effective development and review of its own very specific corporate plans, policies and strategies, it follows, therefore, that *each law enforcement organisation will have a legitimate requirement for strategic intelligence support.*

5. Production of Strategic Intelligence

Strategic intelligence activity will have, as its clients, corporate planners and senior executives of the organisation and the product will be delivered in the form of continuing or special strategic intelligence assessments. These assessments will encompass a range of subjects that have particular importance for that agency. They may cover, for example, analysis and interpretation of such medium- and longer-term, broadly based issues as changes in type and the nature of threats posed by organised criminal groups, as well as trends and developments in avoidance methodologies, with forecasts for change to the pattern of criminal behaviour.

6. Intelligence Development Within Enforcement Agencies

As indicated in the earlier part of this paper, it is a comparatively recent phenomenon that any of the Australian law enforcement agencies have become involved in the production of strategic intelligence product in any truly effective, structured fashion. The understandable preoccupation of all agencies has been to set up information gathering and recording networks and focus on the production of tactical intelligence likely to be of more immediate use. This preoccupation with tactical intelligence has not, of course, been limited to the Australian law enforcement scene: the development of agency and government awareness of the need for the development of strategic intelligence services is just as recent a phenomenon among overseas law enforcement jurisdictions as it has been in Australia.

At a Federal level, the national law enforcement agencies clearly all have similar sets of regulatory, enforcement or crime prevention responsibilities that transcend State/Territory boundaries. While there is the obvious need for maintenance of a tactical intelligence capacity, each agency also has a justifiable need to develop (and review) corporate policies and plans to meet the changing crime scene. In other words, each therefore needs a strategic intelligence service to point the way of change and enable policy decisions to be taken in a climate of awareness and forewarning. All of these national (Commonwealth) agencies, to varying degrees, have acted to develop this capacity.

Outside of the Federal arena, only a few of the State and Territory law enforcement agencies have become interested in the production of strategic intelligence product, and this only very recently. Insofar as knowledge of strategic intelligence developments and warnings may assist the formulation of policies and conduct of operational responsibilities at the State and Territory level, it has remained the generally held view that it is more

appropriate for the ABCI to function as the conduit for dissemination of strategic intelligence product developed by other federal agencies and, in due course, by the ABCI itself.

7. Focus of Strategic Intelligence Tasking

It is a truism that intelligence tasking within any organisation is and, to be organisationally effective, *must be* tasked to address defined organisational goals.

Intelligence doctrine universally teaches that all intelligence effort is directed in pursuit of defined "problems", these being conceived in terms that directly address established organisational concerns. What this means is that, for both tactical and strategic intelligence development within an organisation, intelligence tasking can only legitimately focus upon those areas of activity that fall within the defined parameters of that organisation's role. Thus, the intelligence effort is truly agency-specific, although there is considerable scope for sensible and co-operative pooling of effort and sharing of resources between agencies when the intelligence "problem" can be seen to impact upon more than a single agency, each only extracting that which is appropriate to its needs.

This, then, is the inevitable - and appropriate - outcome: unless spurred on by wider interests, an agency intelligence unit will tend to collect and process a wide range of data to produce strategic intelligence assessments that specifically address only issues of concern to that agency's specific role.

8. Information Sources and Collection

There are many important requirements for the effective production of useful intelligence. In Part 2, these requirements (and their "cost") are discussed in more detail. It is appropriate here to briefly consider the issue of sourcing and use of information relevant to the intelligence effort. The intelligence process cannot survive without the input of data. While items of information, themselves, may have little or no intrinsic worth, providing that the data gathered meets the criteria of relevance, accuracy and timeliness, then the intelligence process has the potential to provide a value-added holistic product, greater in the whole than merely the sum of its contributing parts.

Data collection is as disciplined a component of the intelligence process as is any other. It is neither efficient nor effective for intelligence operations to merely rely on gathering everything possible about every conceivable subject of interest. Rather, there must be an orderly approach to defining subject areas of interest; identifying the sort of information that is likely to illuminate those issues; selecting the most likely (existing and potential) sources to provide that information; and, finally, accessing the sources and collecting the data.

The key element of this part of the process is the definition of the information to be sought; the vehicle for this is the intelligence collection plan. It is generally the rule that, accepting and allowing for the focus that needs to be applied to the final intelligence product (in terms of organisational imperatives), the collection plan must nonetheless examine the subject in the widest possible context to ensure that the necessary fine tuning of the assessment is both rational and logical. The final product cannot be expected to be effectively developed unless the analysis and interpretation components of the process have taken place in an atmosphere of broad but detailed awareness of all the issues surrounding the intelligence "problem".

For those Federal law enforcement agencies involved in developing strategic intelligence, much of the emphasis on major crime developments is tied in with overseas developments and, indeed, may be initiated by crime groups either located abroad or connected with overseas criminal organisations.

Certainly, changes in the international scene have been shown to have significant impact on such issues as money laundering and transfer, and production and transportation of illicit drugs. Australian federal law enforcement agencies have established, in recent years, wide networks of international sources of information of use in the intelligence arena. The information thus made available is not only useful in the development of tactical intelligence in direct support of law enforcement operations, but also contributes importantly to the on-going strategic intelligence study of threat assessments in respect of major categories of crime.

MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

The Cost of Intelligence

Worthwhile intelligence cannot be produced without cost. It is appropriate in the context of this paper to consider the key requirements of intelligence activity and the various forms of cost associated with them. The most obvious example of cost is the intelligence unit's demands for high levels of continuing input of every sort of conceivably useful, relevant information. However, the overall "cost" associated with intelligence work is quite extensive and may include (but is not limited to) those components listed below:

- *measurable costs:*
 - human resources
 - training and development
 - equipment
 - administrative funds
 - time
 - information collection mechanisms
 - dissemination and reporting resources
- *other "costs" (impact of changed priorities)*
 - unfulfilled expectations
 - frustration

As a start point in the discussion of intelligence resource requirements, it is as well to recognise that it is an accepted maxim of the discipline of intelligence that there are three principal prerequisites for the effective production of all intelligence. These elements are:

1. a clear understanding of the organisation's goals and objectives coupled with a detailed knowledge of the organisation's operational activities and routines;
2. access to information that is appropriate to the nature of the assessment work envisaged; and
3. the availability of necessary resources - appropriately trained personnel, funds, equipment.

These requirements generally hold good for production of intelligence, regardless of whether the final product is to serve a strategic or tactical end. Having said this, there are some significant differences in the way in which these three prerequisite requirements are approached and defined, depending upon the ultimate outcome and consumption of the intelligence product.

Staffing and Development

The "cycle" of intelligence activity¹³ demands, like any other endeavour, application of a particular set of skills and techniques. These can be easily learned, although in their application within the discipline of intelligence, it is often considered that the practice demands going beyond the question of mere technical ability, and requires the addition of qualities of extra performance that include, for example, imagination and flair (even those these

¹³ The terms *cycle* and *process* are used equally within intelligence circles to describe the chain of action that encompasses the steps of collection, collation, evaluation, integration, analysis, interpretation, reporting, dissemination and review.

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notions are, at best, ill-defined by those arguing in their favour). Perhaps, for this reason, selection of personnel to carry out intelligence assessment functions has often seemed to be more difficult than expected and has not always been as successful as hoped.

It should be noted that training and development programs for intelligence analysis are already well tried and established, initially for tactical analysis and more latterly for advanced strategic intelligence assessment. Intelligence doctrine is, however, dynamic and training and development cycles need to provide opportunities for staff to refresh and gain new skills and techniques.

Accepting the arguments (and the difficulties outlined earlier), any detailed study of the intelligence process unequivocally points to the necessity of careful selection and training of personnel, if they are to be able to master the intricacies of the intelligence process and become effective in the production of intelligence. Various selection and recruitment strategies to fill the intelligence ranks have been tried, running the gamut from secondment of experienced line staff (who understand the organisational milieu and, it is felt, "only" need additional, specialised training), to direct recruitment of tertiary qualified staff to function as analysts (based on an assumption that tertiary training provides an adequate demonstration of applicable research-based skills).

Neither the examples given above, nor their many variations, necessarily succeed fully or on every occasion. One important factor, often overlooked, is that intelligence itself is not a single stream activity. The craft is a specialised, disciplined one embodying technical and intellectual ability, but it is composed of a number of equally specialised sub-activities that make the intelligence process work.

Successful strategies for selection and training for intelligence work recognise the necessity for defining "the job" and preparing the right staff with the appropriate tools, skills, knowledge and technical ability to handle the particular role assigned to them. On the other hand, staffing intelligence units by moving personnel in for any reason other than their desire and ability to work in intelligence invites failure, even though this may only be seen, eventually, as the inability to realise the full potential of the individual(s) and the unit against a background of opportunities lost.

The essence of intelligence work is the ability to process vast volumes of data, against a background of need as defined by the intelligence "problem", to describe both what is happening and what is likely to be the outcome. The demands placed on individuals to forecast in what is, inevitably, an uncertain environment, places its own stresses on those employed in intelligence. Operational urgencies add to the pressure and, yet, offsetting this is the sense of achievement that buoys the spirit and encourages and enthuses the practitioners.

Material and Administrative Costs

In general terms, intelligence units represent high-cost activities where the emphasis is on data collection, storage and communication. This is particularly the case for those agencies having operational responsibilities that demand the production of tactical intelligence.

The development of strategic intelligence creates different demands for resources. Providing that the intelligence collection plan takes every opportunity, where appropriate, to utilise data that has already been collected *by other agencies* and holds this data for the limited time necessary for the development and completion of specific projects, then much of the more "traditional" data storage and related costs are substantially diminished. It is essential, however, to provide for the "temporary" collection, maintenance, storage and retrieval of data relevant to particular projects.

Similarly, the high order of travel and other administrative costs that typify the production of tactical intelligence (with its aura of operational immediacy surrounding its processes) are diminished since the production of strategic intelligence functions in an environment somewhat removed from this sense of immediacy. The development of strategic intelligence product has its own pressures - as described elsewhere in this paper - but they are rarely able to be translated into the magnitude of administrative costs associated with operational matters.

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Other Costs

The production of strategic intelligence is almost never a task that is simple or quick. The requirement is for an assessment of the "long view" of a problem, encompassing the widest possible breadth of view consistent with the particular subject. The selection of appropriate staff, the collection of relevant data and the development of properly constructed project plans for each and every assessment are essential components of the activity, each having its own intrinsic cost.

By any yardstick, the management of time is one of the most difficult and demanding elements within the strategic intelligence process. Research, evaluation, analysis and interpretation inevitably take up considerable time and effort and, unlike tactical intelligence production, the strategic intelligence chain of activity has an extra dimension to it that is much more cerebral than merely process-based.

The point to be made here is that, allowing for what might appear to be a less "urgent" environment for the production of strategic intelligence, there are high levels of expectation to be found not only from clients and consumers of the product, but also generated by the intelligence staff themselves. Indeed, once the basic processing of data has been completed, the emphasis in the next phase is on intellectualising the intelligence problem and beginning the task of interpretation - activity that can create high degrees of stress, expectation and frustration. Management of strategic intelligence units must be structured to recognise and respond to these conditions.

PART II : NATIONAL STRATEGIC CRIME INTELLIGENCE THE FUTURE FOR AUSTRALIA

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In the earlier part of this paper I have outlined the established, legitimate role of strategic intelligence developed within and for agency - use in determining corporate plans and policies. This Part argues the potential for providing a national level of strategic crime intelligence - analysis, separate from existing agency-based strategic intelligence activities. By providing strategic intelligence assessments of the total crime environment, such an initiative would support national objectives in the establishment of integrated law enforcement policies, strategies, priorities, resource deployments, organisational requirements and training needs.

In the Australian law enforcement context, both the AFP and Customs have established strategic intelligence programs within their intelligence units. The focus of these strategic "cells" is primarily on issues relevant to their own separate, agency-specific areas of responsibility. Increasingly, however, there is a move towards joint resourcing and direction towards examination of those issues in which the AFP and Customs share common enforcement interests. The NCA, likewise, has accepted a growing need to consider the longer-term picture concerning matters under reference and has enhanced its strategic intelligence capacity since 1990.

The ABCI, in response to the directions set by the Australian Police Ministers' Council, is in the process of varying its traditional focus on major operational matters and has, since mid-1990, established a strategic intelligence analysis capacity as an addition to its normal range of interests. Other federal agencies (for example, Immigration, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, the Cash Transactions Reports Agency and the Australian Tax Office) increasingly are accepting that there is occasional (if not continuing) benefit to be gained by addressing intelligence issues within their areas of interest from a strategic (not just operational) point of view.

DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Given that many of the federal law enforcement agencies are organisationally established within different ministerial portfolios, government policy-making in the Commonwealth law enforcement arena requires input from several portfolios, each with its own perspective of its role and responsibilities. In the case of the Attorney-General's portfolio, this covers a further range of agencies: the AFP, NCA, CTRA and, to some extent (being its administrative "host"), the ABCI.

It is a logical extension of these arrangements that policies that can be viewed as impacting principally on single agencies tend to be developed, in the main, within the portfolios handling those agencies. Even allowing for the cross-pollination of ideas during the development of major policies (through the Cabinet Submission mechanism, which requires inter-agency contact), this singularity of approach tends to dominate government policy development within law enforcement.

The scenario above presents an acute dilemma for those involved in law enforcement policy and strategy development. While this remains the established and approved pattern of how policies are shaped, there exists now a realisation that these arrangements are not at all consistent with what is known about the nature of criminal endeavour. Any historical justification of the existing, independent and individualistic approach of what amounts to a combined set of discrete law enforcement agency strategies, lacks congruence with the present state of awareness of the intricacies of criminal organisation and activity.

Realistic perceptions of crime and its impact on society suggest that the existing approach has reached the limits of its usefulness. The complexity of crime and its far-reaching impact upon society is already well understood and documented. In this context, maintenance of the existing approach to national law enforcement policy-making and strategy-setting, based on the singularity of agency perceptions of the crime "problem", is unlikely to

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achieve the full measure of national (i.e., Federal and State) potential to combat the overall threat. Each of the law enforcement agencies involved in this arena of policy development will inevitably draw on its integral strategic intelligence capability for its assessment of the intelligence problem - an assessment that is necessarily drafted from the agency's singular perspective of the threat to and impact on its areas of responsibility.

Government policy-making has, as a principal objective, the establishment of comprehensive strategies that suit society as a whole. It follows that the analysis of crime and its overall impact must, similarly, go well beyond traditional limitations that are imposed, however inadvertently, by the vision imparted by individual agencies involved in the strategic intelligence assessment process. The result of the existing chain of activity, as described above, is that national law enforcement policies run the risk of being (or becoming) a collection of individual agency strategies focused towards goals that are, themselves, unable to be properly articulated *because no single, complete definition and description of the crime environment is available to the combined justice agencies nor to governments.*

If what is required is a process that results in determining a truly national approach to establishing comprehensive law enforcement policies and strategies, then it follows that reliance upon a set of individual agency-based intelligence assessments as the basis for understanding the totality of the crime environment is flawed. There is, clearly, unarguable justification for the provision of this holistic level of strategic intelligence assessment service covering the criminal environment if governments are to understand the nature and scope of crime and, as a result, be able to develop the appropriate matrix of law enforcement policies and strategies.

REQUIREMENTS OF A NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Basic Outline

There is no need, in this Part, to go over ground already described in some detail earlier in the paper. The essential components of any arrangements set in place to deliver a national level of law enforcement strategic intelligence product for executive-level government consumption, will remain very similar to those already in existence at agency level. Certain differences will, of necessity, apply in respect of these issues listed immediately below, explained in some detail in following paragraphs:

1. definition of the role of (and limitations imposed upon) a national intelligence activity
2. mandate for areas of assessment and research
3. tasking
4. information-sharing and distribution of product
5. administrative arrangements, covering establishment and organisation, staffing and security
6. existing models and other options

Role

This has already been stated in a number of different ways in this paper. Essentially, what is needed is a national law enforcement intelligence service for government decision-makers that is capable of carrying out comprehensive strategic intelligence assessments of the criminal environment and its impact on Australian society. The output of such a service would provide both definitions and descriptions of the crime "problem" as well as forecasts of trends and developments.

There are two key features of any such intelligence service:

1. To be effective, its purview of data (by type and origin) cannot be limited simply to law enforcement information concerning what is known about criminals and crime. What is needed is the capacity to develop a clear grasp of the totality of the impact of crime upon society, in all its aspects, as a basis

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for focusing upon the development of sensible law enforcement strategies that "fit" into national policy-making.

2. Since the rationale for this service is solely to generate strategic intelligence assessments, it will be dis-beneficial for those involved to have any role related to operational activities. Indeed, those involved in the strategic intelligence service proposed should remain absolutely divorced from other organisational units or agencies that are involved in operational activities. To do otherwise is to run the risk of skewing the focus of the service away from its necessary isolation and "neutrality" and impart, instead, some sense of the parenting body's responsibilities and views.

Tasking of the Assessment Activity

The focus of this national strategic intelligence service should be to examine and provide assessment on all areas of the criminal environment that threaten public order. Much work has already been done within the law enforcement community to identify and list priorities of subjects deserving urgent attention for examination and assessment. Throughout these developments, there has been a tendency to focus on deciding which of the existing agencies should carry out the role, ignoring the principles espoused above. This difficulty in identifying a suitable agency to undertake this essential work is not only evidence of the deficiencies in the present system but further argument in support of establishing the type of crime assessment service discussed in this paper.

An additional and equally important feature of tasking will be to examine not only those areas of established criminal activity, but to maintain a continuing overview of activities that - while not necessarily being "criminal" under present statutes - nonetheless represent modes of behaviour that are considered aberrant, anti-social or otherwise unacceptable to society.

The strategic intelligence service must be equipped with a wide mandate to access data and conduct research to provide assessment on the projects decided upon. This will necessitate access to data already held within the law enforcement environment that can be made available, subject to security provisions and prevailing operational requirements. If the full range of criminal impact areas is to be effectively canvassed, it will be necessary for the service unit to have access, also, to a much wider range of State and Territory agencies than might normally be the experience of existing intelligence units.

Legitimacy and mandate can be provided in several ways. For example, these notions can be addressed in the drafting of a definitive role for the service unit by government and in formalising information access arrangements with all the relevant agencies (law enforcement and others). However, much of the success of the service unit's activities in information collection will derive not so much from formalised arrangements but also through effective and sensitive liaison between the service unit and those agencies *and* through a positive, pro-active program of sharing the final, value-added intelligence product with the contributors.

ORGANISATIONAL SCENARIO

As discussed earlier, organisational placement and establishment of the service unit needs to take into account the requirement that the unit be separated from the normal run of law enforcement agencies (with their on-going operational responsibilities) and exist, instead, in a more neutral and isolated environment. This concept accepts that existing law enforcement agencies already have a legitimate role to produce and consume strategic intelligence in order to develop or modify their operational strategies and plans.

While it could be hypothesised that one or other of the existing agencies could set up and run the sort of service unit envisaged in this paper, the reality is that no existing agency has the mandate, the focus or the commitment necessary for the development of strategic intelligence that looks comprehensively at all areas of criminal impact on society. More importantly, the very nature of the agencies, their task orientation and the staff resources typically available to them, by and large mitigates against their being able to sensibly assume the service unit role outlined herein.

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Organisational placement should take into account the need for a level of "freedom" for the service unit to develop and conduct its assessment activities separated from pressures related to information/intelligence collection activities or operational urgencies that occur in existing law enforcement agencies. The essence of the service unit is that, to be effective, it must be an intelligence *assessment* unit in its own right, not a service adjunct to support some defined operational function elsewhere.

ESTABLISHMENT OPTIONS

The separate, discrete but highly-focused nature of the service unit as conceived in this paper might be compared with the Office of National Assessments as a guide. That organisation has a role definitively outlined in support of national defence policy-making similar to that envisaged for the law enforcement strategic intelligence service.

Whatever the shape and placement of the strategic assessment unit, it would appear feasible to consider the following prescriptions as options:

- staff numbers (and attendant equipment) can be kept to a minimum since intelligence assessment and research activities make up the predominant requirement, rather than active collection-related functions;
- the amalgamation of skills and experience to conduct highly specialised national assessments could well be met through a combination of permanent posting plus temporary assignment to the unit, with other law enforcement agencies providing the pool of short-term assignment personnel from within the ranks of their intelligence organisations;
- budget support for the strategic assessment unit will not place high demands on government - apart from the provision of essential worktable equipment (computers *et al*), the principal recurrent costs will be for salaries, travel within Australia and communications costs;
- management of the functioning of the unit should operate at three levels:
 - i. task direction and overall reporting to and through a nominated "peak" agency, department or committee;
 - ii. the senior officer of the strategic unit, directing the programs of assessment and managing human and financial resources day to day, responsible for reporting to the governing body; and
 - iii. project management, effected through team leaders operating within project groups.

CONCLUSION

The role of strategic intelligence within law enforcement in Australia is recognised, accepted and, in some cases, extant. It is well understood that individual law enforcement agencies have legitimate need for strategic intelligence capacity to meet their own organisational objectives.

If national governments are to move towards development of law enforcement strategies that are integrated in such a way as to meet the totality of the criminal environment threat in all its aspects, then it is essential that an intelligence support capacity be developed to provide holistic strategic intelligence product to define and map the criminal environment.

Of the several options available, one thing is certain: there are no benefits that would accrue from mandating such a role any existing agency. All already have their own functions and responsibilities and, in some cases, the strategic intelligence capacity to support them. To add a new role, one that transcends normal law enforcement intelligence capacity, would act as a negative force impinging both upon the traditional, established intelligence needs of the agency selected, as well as on the potential for the production of what should be a truly national level of strategic criminal assessment.

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The choice of solution must be guided by both principle and pragmatism. Translation of the accepted need into reality means, in essence, that decisions and choices have to be made free from the noise generated by competing interests. It is difficult to envisage any sensible solution going beyond the ultimate choice of the ABCI as the site for the sort of national strategic intelligence production outlined in this paper. However, what is needed now is not merely a quick decision in principle, but a planned, comprehensive approach to the development of the capacity to undertake the role expected.

A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Don McDowell is a specialist adviser, researcher, teacher and consultant on intelligence matters, particularly on strategic analysis and research. With a long intelligence career in defence, international relations, national security and law enforcement, he has for the last several years been providing consulting services in Europe, North and Central America, and the Asia-Pacific region. He has written extensively on strategic intelligence as a tool for management, on the doctrine and teaching of its techniques. He continues to conduct strategic and operational research for various governments and lectures extensively around the world

Don is the author of three books on strategic research processes¹⁴, plus one on their application to the issue of wildlife crime¹⁵. He is active academically and works in university circles in Australia and North America on intelligence analysis curriculum development, particularly distance-based studies.

As well as being a lifetime member of the International Society of Certified Criminal Analysts, Don holds long-term membership in several related professional associations. He is active, too, in the business world, providing advice on strategic development issues to various corporate groups.

¹⁴ **STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE : A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS, MANAGERS AND USERS.**
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¹⁵ **WILDLIFE CRIME, POLICY AND THE LAW : AN AUSTRALIAN STUDY.**
Don McDowell. Environment Australia 1997, AGPS, Canberra, Australia. ISBN 0 644 476117